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INTRODUCTION
In 2006, George Alvarez, a ninth grade, special education student,
pleaded guilty to assault of a peace officer in Brownsville, Texas.1 Four
years into his eight year sentence, Alvarez learned that the State had
suppressed a video of the incident that proved his actual innocence.2
The video showed the officer placing Alvarez in a chokehold and a
headlock while Alvarez flailed beneath him.3 Alvarez later brought an
action under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 against the City of Brownsville,
claiming the city violated the Brady doctrine by failing to disclose
material exculpatory evidence. In rejecting his claim in a 2018 en banc
opinion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
concluded that “case law from the Supreme Court, this circuit, and
other circuits does not affirmatively establish that a constitutional
violation occurs when Brady material is not shared during the plea
bargaining process.”4 Given that around 95% of convictions are secured
through guilty pleas,5 such an interpretation of Brady means that few
defendants are entitled to evidence of their innocence before being
convicted.
This Article argues, however, that these courts are ignoring a largely
forgotten Supreme Court opinion that was central to the creation of the
Brady doctrine. In its 1960 opinion in Wilde v. Wyoming,6 the Supreme
Court recognized that the suppression of favorable substantive evidence
before a defendant’s guilty plea can violate the Due Process Clause.
Three years later, the Supreme Court stated that its opinion in Brady v.
Maryland7 was merely an extension of its prior opinions such as Wilde.
And yet, while each of the other opinions that formed the foundation
for the Brady doctrine has had a lasting legacy, the Wilde opinion has
been lost to time despite never being repudiated. This Article calls for a
resurrection of the Wilde opinion and the recognition of a right to
evidence of innocence before pleading guilty.
Part I discusses the Supreme Court opinions that laid the groundwork
for the Brady doctrine. Part II dissects the Supreme Court’s Brady
opinion and subsequent Supreme Court opinions interpreting the Brady
doctrine. Part III explores the split among courts over whether there is
1
2
3
4
5
6
7

Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 385-88 (5th Cir. 2018).
See id. at 388.
See id.
Id. at 394.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
362 U.S. 607, 900-01 (1960).
373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
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a pre-plea right to substantive evidence of innocence. Part IV makes the
case for recognizing that Wilde recognized a clear right to evidence of
innocence before pleading guilty. Finally, Part V argues that the
Supreme Court did not impliedly repudiate Wilde in its opinion in
United States v. Ruiz.
I.

THE ROAD TO BRADY
A. Introduction

There were six key Supreme Court cases that the Brady Court used in
creating the Brady doctrine.8 These were all cases that involved
allegations that the subornation of perjury and/or the suppression of
exculpatory evidence violated the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due
Process Clause, which states: “[N]or shall any State deprive any person
of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law.”9 This Part
focuses on these six cases that formed the foundation for the Brady
doctrine to flesh out its history and contours.
B. Mooney v. Holohan
The Supreme Court first suggested10 that the knowing subornation of
perjury (i.e., a prosecutor calling a witness he knows will lie) can violate
the Due Process Clause in its 1935 opinion in Mooney v. Holohan.11 In
1916, before the United States entered what became known as World
War I, a pro-war rally was held near the intersection of Steuart and
Market Streets in San Francisco.12 During the rally, a bomb went off at
2:06 p.m., killing nine people and injuring several others.13 Pinkerton
Detective Martin Swanson soon had a suspect: “Thomas J. Mooney, a
militant Socialist and labor activist, who had already been charged and
acquitted several times of transporting explosives with the purpose of
destroying the transmission lines of the Pacific Gas and Electric

8

See id. at 86-87.
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
10 See, e.g., Stephen A. Saltzburg, Perjury and False Testimony: Should the Difference
Matter So Much?, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1537, 1554 (2000) (“The first case to hold that a
prosecutor who knowingly used false or perjured testimony denied a defendant due
process was Mooney v. Holohan.”).
11 Mooney v. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 111-13 (1935).
12 Rebecca Roiphe, Lawyering at the Extremes: The Representation of Tom Mooney,
1916-1939, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1731, 1731, 1754 n.113 (2009).
13 See Ex parte Mooney, 73 P.2d 554, 557 (Cal. 1937).
9
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Company (PG&E).”14 The State eventually secured first-degree murder
convictions and death sentences against Mooney and his alleged coconspirators.15
At the time, observers noted the lack of evidence against Mooney.16
The State’s star witness was Frank Oxman, a wealthy cattleman, who
was the only person “to put Mooney at the scene of explosion at the
correct time.”17 Oxman testified that he had seen Mooney and his
assistant place a suitcase outside a saloon near the explosion at around
1:45 p.m., with Mooney saying, “Let’s go; the bulls will be after us.”18
This timing was key because Mooney was photographed at 2:01 p.m. on
the roof of his apartment on Market Street between Fifth and Sixth
Streets, more than a mile away from the site of the explosion; the 1:45
p.m. sighting gave “ample time for Mooney to return to his building
where he had been photographed.”19
After he was convicted of murder, Mooney filed a petition for writ of
habeas corpus with the United States District Court for the District of
Northern California based on evidence that, inter alia, Oxman was not
in San Francisco at the time of the explosion.20 Mooney’s petition
alleged two violations of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process
Clause: (1) the State secured his conviction through the knowing use of
perjured testimony and the deliberate suppression of impeachment
evidence; and (2) the state of California failed to provide a corrective
judicial process.21
Mooney’s petition eventually reached the Supreme Court, which did
not address Mooney’s contention of suppressed evidence in its per
curiam opinion.22 The Court, however, made a powerful proclamation
with regard to perjured testimony. According to the Court, the
requirement of due process,
cannot be deemed to be satisfied by mere notice and hearing if
a State has contrived a conviction through the pretense of a trial
which in truth is but used as a means of depriving a defendant
of liberty through a deliberate deception of court and jury by

14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22

Roiphe, supra note 12, at 1731.
See Mooney, 294 U.S. at 109.
See Roiphe, supra note 12, at 1731.
Id. at 1741.
Id. at 1741-42.
Id. at 1742.
See Mooney, 294 U.S. at 109-10; Roiphe, supra note 12, at 1745.
See Mooney, 294 U.S. at 110.
See generally id.
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the presentation of testimony known to be perjured. Such a
contrivance by a State to procure the conviction and
imprisonment of a defendant is as inconsistent with the
rudimentary demands of justice as is the obtaining of a like
result by intimidation.23
The Court, however, found that California did provide for a
corrective judicial process by allowing for writs of habeas corpus.24
Because Mooney had not applied to the state for a writ of habeas corpus,
the Court denied him relief, but without prejudice.25 Mooney later filed
a habeas petition in state court, with the Supreme Court of California
eventually denying him relief based upon a lack of evidence that the
State had suborned perjury.26 Finally, in 1937, California Governor
Culbert L. Olson pardoned Mooney, claiming that he was innocent.27
The opinion of the Court in Mooney thus created the idea that the
knowing subornation of perjury can violate the Due Process Clause.
C. Pyle v. Kansas
Seven years after its decision in Mooney, the Supreme Court addressed
another allegation that a conviction was tainted by perjury in Pyle v.
Kansas28 in 1942. In 1934, August and Otto Reiter had $24,000 in
government bonds buried near their home outside Hudson, Kansas.29
Two days before Christmas, Harry Pyle and his son “Babe” were
allegedly involved in a plan to steal the money that ended with August
being fatally shot.30 After he was convicted of robbery and murder,
Harry Pyle unsuccessfully brought a pro se petition for writ of habeas
corpus in state court.31
Harry Pyle thereafter appealed to the United States Supreme Court,
alleging a laundry list of constitutional violations.32 Specifically, he
claimed that the State had (1) threatened two witnesses for the
23

Id. at 112.
See id. at 113.
25 See id. at 115.
26 See Ex parte Mooney, 73 P.2d 554, 596 (Cal. 1937).
27 See Roiphe, supra note 12, at 1759. Olson had previously asked Mooney to
support his gubernatorial bid in exchange for a promise that his first act would be to
pardon Mooney. See id.
28 Pyle v. State of Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 214 (1942).
29 See State v. Pyle, 57 P.2d 93, 94 (Kan. 1936).
30 Id. at 96-97.
31 See Pyle, 317 U.S. at 213-14.
32 See id. at 215-16.
24
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prosecution, including one committed to a mental institution, into
testifying falsely against him; and (2) suppressed the exculpatory
testimony of a husband and wife through intimidation.33 The Supreme
Court cited two exhibits in support of these allegations: a letter and an
affidavit by a man named Truman Reynolds, who claimed that he was
forced to give perjured testimony and wrote to Harry Pyle that “Your
conviction was a grave mistake.”34
The Supreme Court found that Harry Pyle’s papers were inexpertly
drawn but that they did “set forth allegations that his imprisonment
resulted from perjured testimony, knowingly used by the State
authorities to obtain his conviction, and from the deliberate suppression
by those same authorities of evidence favorable to him.”35 Citing
Mooney, the Court held that these allegations, if true, would establish a
Constitutional violation and that they were supported by the
aforementioned exhibits.36 Because there had been no legal
determination of the veracity of these allegations, the Supreme Court
reversed the denial of habeas relief and remanded for further
proceedings.37
On remand, the Supreme Court of Kansas subsequently found that
Harry Pyle had failed to prove that the State either knowingly suborned
perjury or suppressed exculpatory evidence; the court therefore denied
his petition for writ of habeas corpus.38 It does not appear that the elder
Pyle ever received relief, but his son “Babe” was later pardoned in
1959.39
In Pyle, the Court thus built upon Mooney, suggesting that either the
knowing subornation of perjury or the willful suppression of
exculpatory evidence can violate the Due Process Clause.
D. Durley v. Mayo
Twelve years after its opinion in Pyle, the United States Supreme
Court had an opportunity to address whether Mooney and Pyle applied
in a case of unknowingly suborned perjury in Durley v. Mayo40 in 1956.

33

See id. at 214.
Id. at 215.
35 Id. at 215-16.
36 See id. at 216.
37 See id.
38 See Pyle v. Amrine, 156 P.2d 509, 518-21 (Kan. 1945).
39 See Janet Moore, Democracy and Criminal Discovery Reform After Connick and
Garcetti, 77 BROOK. L. REV. 1329, 1337 n.58 (2012).
40 Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277 (1956).
34
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In 1945, Dan Durley was charged with three counts of “Horse or Cattle
Stealing” based upon his alleged theft of two steers, two cows, and one
heifer in Polk County, Florida.41 The only evidence linking Durley to
the thefts was the testimony of Durley’s alleged accomplices, R. B.
Massey, Jr. and Charles Bath.42 After Durley was convicted, he filed
successive petitions for relief.43 One of these was a petition for writ of
habeas corpus claiming that his conviction was unconstitutional because
the prosecution unknowingly suborned perjury by Massey and Bath.44
In support of his petition, Durley submitted two affidavits.45 The first
affidavit was by inmate J. E. Croft, who claimed that Bath told him that
Durley was “completely innocent” and that Massey and he created a
plan to pin the crimes on Durley if they were caught in connection with
their cattle-stealing ventures.46 The second affidavit was by Massey, who
stated, “Before God is my judge Dan Durley, never had anything to do
with any cattle stealing that I testified to at the trial.”47 While Durley
did not allege that the State was aware that it was suborning perjury at
his trial, he did claim that the State could not “let his conviction stand
solely on perjured testimony.”48 The Supreme Court of Florida
ultimately denied Durley relief without a hearing.49
In a majority opinion, the United States Supreme Court later
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear Durley’s appeal because the
Supreme Court of Florida’s opinion may have been based on state,
rather than federal, grounds.50 Justice Douglas, however, wrote a
dissenting opinion that was joined by three other justices.51 After
finding jurisdiction, Justice Douglas cited Mooney and Pyle for the
proposition that “[i]t is well settled that to obtain a conviction by the
use of testimony known by the prosecution to be perjured offends due
process.”52 According to Justice Douglas, “[w]hile the petition did not
allege that the prosecution knew that petitioner’s codefendants were
lying when they implicated petitioner, the State now knows that the
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52

Id. at 278.
See id. at 286 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See id. at 286-88.
See id. at 286-87.
See id. at 287.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 288.
See id. at 285.
See id.
See id.
Id. at 290-91.
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testimony of the only witnesses against petitioner was false.”53 Based
upon the lack of any remaining competent evidence to support Durley’s
conviction, Justice Douglas held that the denial of a hearing on Durley’s
habeas petition deprived him of due process of law.54
E. Alcorta v. Texas
The following year, in 1957, the Supreme Court addressed another
allegation of suborned perjury in Alcorta v. Texas.55 In 1955, Alvaro
Alcorta came home to his house at about 2:00 a.m. and saw his wife and
a man named Natividad Castilleja sitting in a car in front of the house.56
Alcorta pulled out a knife and fatally stabbed his wife.57 According to
Alcorta, Castilleja and his wife were kissing.58 Castilleja, however,
testified that Alcorta’s wife and he were just casual friends, that he had
driven her home on the night in question, and that they were parked in
front of the house due to engine trouble.59 Because the jury credited
Castilleja’s story, they found Alcorta guilty of murder and gave him a
death sentence. If the jury had believed Alcorta’s story that seeing his
wife kissing another man sent him into a rage, they could have found
him guilty of murder without malice, which carried a maximum
sentence of five years of incarceration.60
Alcorta later brought a petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging that
the prosecutor in his case had knowingly suborned perjury by
Castilleja.61 At the hearing on that petition, Castilleja testified that he
told the prosecutor that he’d had sexual intercourse with Alcorta’s wife
on five or six occasions shortly before her death.62 According to
Castilleja, “the prosecutor had told him he should not volunteer any
information about such intercourse but if specifically asked about it to
answer truthfully.”63 The prosecutor subsequently admitted in
testimony that he had knowingly suborned perjury by Castilleja.64
53

Id. at 291.
See id.
55 Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957).
56 Brief for Petitioner at 7, Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28 (1957) (No. 139), 1957 WL
87099, at *7.
57 See Alcorta, 355 U.S. at 28-29.
58 See id.
59 See id. at 29.
60 See id. at 29, 32.
61 See id. at 30.
62 See id. at 30-31.
63 Id. at 31.
64 See id.
54
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Based on this evidence, the Supreme Court held that Alcorta was
denied due process under the principles laid down in Mooney and Pyle.65
The Court concluded that the perjury knowingly suborned by the
prosecutor “gave the jury the false impression that [Castilleja’s]
relationship with [Alcorta]’s wife was nothing more than that of casual
friendship.”66 Finding that in the absence of such perjury the jury might
merely have found Alcorta guilty of the less serious offense of murder
without malice, the Court reversed and remanded to the Court of
Criminal Appeals of Texas for further proceedings.67 Following the
mandate of the Supreme Court, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed
Alcorta’s murder conviction.68
F.

Napue v. Illinois

Two years after Alcorta, the Supreme Court further extended the
holding from Mooney in its 1959 opinion in Napue v. Illinois.69 In 1938,
Henry Napue and three other men allegedly entered a dimly lit Chicago
lounge and announced their intention to rob it.70 An off-duty police
officer responded by pulling out a gun and firing it; the officer was then
killed in the ensuing shootout.71 Due to the lack of light and the passage
of time before Napue was prosecuted for murder, the State relied heavily
on the testimony of Napue’s alleged accomplice, George Hamer, who
was already serving a 199 year sentence in connection with the
incident.72
At Napue’s trial, Hamer testified that he was not testifying based upon
a promise of consideration by the Assistant State’s Attorney.73 The
Assistant State’s Attorney had, however, made such a promise.74 And,
while the Assistant State’s Attorney did not expect Hamer’s false
testimony, he did nothing to correct it.75 The jury was told, however,

65

See id.
Id.
67 See id. at 32.
68 See Alcorta v. State, 308 S.W.2d 519, 519 (Tex. Crim. App. 1957).
69 Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 269-72 (1959); see Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S.
83, 87 (1963) (“In Napue v. Illinois, . . . we extended the test formulated in Mooney v.
Holohan . . . .”).
70 See Napue, 360 U.S. at 265.
71 See id.
72 See id. at 265-66.
73 See id. at 265.
74 See id.
75 See id.
66
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“that a public defender had promised ‘to do what he could’ for
[Hamer].”76
Napue’s post-conviction petition was eventually denied by the
Supreme Court of Illinois, which found no due process violation
because the jury had heard about the public defender’s offer to aid
Hamer.77 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court disagreed. The
Court first cited Mooney, Pyle, and related cases for the proposition “that
a conviction obtained through use of false evidence, known to be such
by representatives of the State, must fall under the Fourteenth
Amendment.”78 It then cited Alcorta and related cases to conclude that
“[t]he same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false
evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.”79 The Court
went on to note that “[t]he principle that a State may not knowingly use
false evidence, including false testimony, to obtain a tainted conviction
. . . does not cease to apply merely because the false testimony goes only
to the credibility of the witness.”80 Instead, “[t]he jury’s estimate of the
truthfulness and reliability of a given witness may well be determinative
of guilt or innocence, and it is upon such subtle factors as the possible
interest of the witness in testifying falsely that a defendant’s life or
liberty may depend.”81
In March 1960, the State dismissed the charges against Napue.82 He
later sought compensation for his twenty years of false imprisonment,
but the Illinois Court of Claims denied his request, finding that Napue
hadn’t proven his innocence by a preponderance of the evidence.83
G. Wilde v. Wyoming
One year after Napue was decided, in 1960, the Supreme Court issued
its opinion in Wilde v. Wyoming, with petitioner Victor Donald Wilde
representing himself pro se. Wilde is a short per curiam opinion,
consisting of only four sentences.84 Here is the entirety of the Court’s
opinion:
76

Id.
See id. at 268.
78 Id. at 269.
79 Id.
80 Id.
81 Id.
82 See Meghan Barrett Cousino, Henry Napue, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetailpre1989.aspx?caseid=
236. [https://perma.cc/Z92V-M9ZV] (last visited Oct. 23, 2019).
83 See id.
84 Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607 (1960).
77
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The motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis and the
petition for writ of certiorari are granted. In petitions for writ of
habeas corpus, filed with the Second Judicial District Court of
the State of Wyoming and with the Wyoming Supreme Court,
the petitioner alleged, among other grounds for relief, that his
plea of guilty to second-degree murder in December 1945, upon
which he received a life sentence, was induced when he ‘had no
counsel present’ and that the prosecutor wilfully suppressed the
testimony of two eyewitnesses to the alleged crime which would
have exonerated the petitioner. It does not appear from the
record that an adequate hearing on these allegations was held
in the District Court, or any hearing of any nature in, or by
direction of, the Supreme Court. We find nothing in our
examination of the record to justify the denial of hearing on
these allegations. The judgment is therefore vacated and the
case is remanded for a hearing thereon. Com. of Pennsylvania ex
rel. Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 76 S.Ct. 223, 100 L.Ed.
126; Sublett v. Adams, 362 U.S. 143, 80 S.Ct. 527, 4 L.Ed.2d
527.85
Until recently, this was the only publicly available information about
the Wilde case: (1) Victor Donald Wilde claimed that his guilty plea to
second-degree murder was improperly induced because, inter alia, the
State willfully suppressed two exculpatory eyewitness statements; and
(2) the Supreme Court remanded because the Wyoming courts had not
justified the denial of a hearing on Wilde’s claim. But, as will be
discussed infra, new documents reveal that Wilde actually created a
right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty.
II.

BRADY AND ITS AFTERMATH
A. Brady v. Maryland

The Supreme Court finally wove together the strands of these six
opinions in 1963 to create the Brady doctrine. In June 1958, John Leo
Brady’s sweetheart Nancy Boblit McGowan (who was married to a man
named Slim) told him that she was pregnant with his child.86 To prove
how much he was committed to McGowan, Brady wrote her a check for
85

Id.
See Thomas L. Dybdahl, An Odd, Almost Senseless Series of Events, MARSHALL
PROJECT (June 24, 2018, 10:00 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2018/06/24/
an-odd-almost-senseless-series-of-events.
86
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$35,000 and told her, “Somehow, . . . in two weeks it’ll be in the bank.”87
Brady, who was earning $1.50 an hour at a tobacco packing company,
devised a plan with McGowan’s brother Donald Boblit to rob a bank in
Stevensville, Maryland.88 Because Brady’s 1947 Ford was unreliable, he
and Boblit decided to forcibly “borrow” the Ford Fairlane belonging to
acquaintance William Brooks.89 The eventual encounter ended with
Brooks being fatally strangled.90
Prior to Brady’s murder trial, his attorney made a request to view all
of Boblit’s extrajudicial statements made in connection with the case
and was shown some of these statements.91 At Brady’s ensuing murder
trial, Boblit testified that Brady was the one who strangled Brooks.92 At
the end of that trial, Brady was convicted of first-degree murder and
given the death penalty.93 After being given the death penalty, Brady
appealed, claiming that the State had suppressed an unsigned statement
by Boblit in which he admitted that he was the one who strangled
Brooks.94 After a full hearing, the circuit court denied Brady relief.95
The Court of Appeals of Maryland later reversed, concluding that
“[t]he suppression or withholding by the State of material evidence
exculpatory to an accused is a violation of due process.”96 As support
for this holding, Maryland’s highest court cited several opinions,
including two from the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit.97 The first opinion was United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, in
which the court used Mooney and Pyle to find a due process violation
based on the suppression of an exculpatory ballistics analysis of a
bloody bullet found at a murder scene.98 And the second opinion was
United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, in which the court found a due
process violation based on the suppression of evidence of the
defendant’s intoxication, which could have been used to rebut the

87

Id.
See id.
89 See id.
90 See id.
91 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 84 (1963).
92 See Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 168 (Md. 1961).
93 See Brady, 373 U.S. at 84.
94 See id.
95 See id. at 84-85.
96 Brady, 174 A.2d at 169.
97 See id. (first citing United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815 (3d Cir.
1952), and then citing United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763 (3d Cir.
1955)).
98 See United States ex rel. Almeida v. Baldi, 195 F.2d 815, 820-21 (3d Cir. 1952).
88
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State’s claim that he committed premeditated murder.99 Applying
similar reasoning, the Court of Appeals of Maryland found a due process
violation, concluding that Boblit’s suppressed confession was material
to Brady’s punishment because it could have led the jury to impose a
life sentence instead of a death sentence.100
On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed this ruling in
Brady v. Maryland.101 The Court began by proclaiming that “[t]his
ruling is an extension of Mooney v. Holohan,” which, as noted, held that
the knowing subornation of perjury violates the Due Process Clause.102
The Brady Court then observed that Pyle v. Kansas phrased this rule
from Mooney “in broader terms” by concluding that allegations of
knowingly suborned perjury and suppressed evidence were sufficient to
charge a deprivation of rights.103 Next, the Court noted that the Third
Circuit in the aforementioned Baldi case interpreted Pyle as holding
“that the ‘suppression of evidence favorable’ to the accused was itself
sufficient to amount to a denial of due process.”104
The Supreme Court then indicated that “[i]n Napue v. Illinois . . . we
extended the test formulated in Mooney v. Holohan when we said: ‘The
same result obtains when the State, although not soliciting false
evidence, allows it to go uncorrected when it appears.’”105 Immediately
after this citation to Napue, the Brady Court added an “And see” citation
to Alcorta v. Texas and Wilde v. Wyoming as well as a “Cf.” citation to
the dissenting opinion in Durley v. Mayo.106 And then, immediately after
citing to these three opinions, the Court created the Brady doctrine:
“We now hold that the suppression by the prosecution of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the
evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment, irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”107
After creating this Brady doctrine, the Court explained how it was
merely an extension of Mooney and its progeny. According to the Court,
“[t]he principle of Mooney v. Holohan is not punishment of society for
misdeeds of a prosecutor but avoidance of an unfair trial to the
99

See United States ex rel. Thompson v. Dye, 221 F.2d 763, 766-78 (3d Cir. 1955).
See Brady, 174 A.2d at 171-72.
101 373 U.S. 83, 90 (1963).
102 See id. at 86. Even before citing Mooney, the Court noted that the Third Circuit’s
opinions in Baldi and Dye had “state[d] the correct constitutional rule.” Id.
103 Id.
104 Id. at 87 (citing Baldi, 195 F.2d at 820).
105 Id. (citation omitted).
106 Id.
107 Id.
100
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accused.”108 This is because “[s]ociety wins not only when the guilty
are convicted but when criminal trials are fair; our system of the
administration of justice suffers when any accused is treated
unfairly.”109 Therefore, the suppression of favorable evidence, like the
subornation of perjury, is a due process violation irrespective of the
good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.110 Finding that Boblit’s
confession was favorable and material to Brady’s punishment, the
Supreme Court agreed with the Court of Appeals of Maryland that its
suppression was a due process violation even though it was not
withheld in bad faith.111
B. Brady’s Aftermath
While the Supreme Court in Brady recognized an obligation for the
State to disclose material exculpatory evidence, it left open a number of
questions, such as when this obligation is triggered and whether it
covers impeachment evidence as well as substantive evidence. Since
Brady, there have been a number of Supreme Court opinions
interpreting the Brady doctrine, but this Article will focus on the
handful that are related to the question of whether there is a right to
evidence of innocence before pleading guilty.
1.

Giglio v. United States

In Brady, the Supreme Court found that the State’s failure to disclose
material substantive evidence violates the Due Process Clause.112
Substantive evidence is evidence that directly bears upon the
defendant’s innocence (or culpability) such as an eyewitness’
identification of an alternate suspect, forensic evidence, or an alternate

108

Id.
Id.
110 See id. at 87-88.
111 See id. at 86-87; see also Norman C. Bay, Old Blood, Bad Blood, and Youngblood:
Due Process, Lost Evidence, and the Limits of Bad Faith, 86 WASH. U. L. REV. 241, 256
(2008) (“Under Brady and its progeny, a due process violation could be found even in
the absence of bad faith.”); Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 1533, 1537 (2010) (“A prosecutor’s failure to abide by her disclosure obligations
under Brady is not subject to a good faith exception.”).
112 See, e.g., Abbott v. United States, 195 F.3d 946, 948 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that
the Supreme Court found that suppression of material substantive evidence violates the
Due Process Clause in Brady and extended this holding to cover material impeachment
evidence in Giglio); Colin Miller, Plea Agreements as Constitutional Contracts, 97 N.C.
L. REV. 31, 67 (2018).
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suspect’s confession.113 In its 1972 opinion in Giglio v. United States,114
the Supreme Court extended the Brady doctrine to cover material
impeachment evidence, i.e., evidence that calls into question the
credibility of a witness for the prosecution.115 In 1966, John Giglio
allegedly concocted a scheme in which he would steal Travellers’
Express money orders and give them to nineteen-year-old bank teller
Robert Taliento, who would cash them so that they could share the
proceeds.116 Giglio was eventually convicted of passing forged money
orders based in large part upon Taliento’s testimony.117 At trial, Taliento
testified that nobody told him he could avoid being prosecuted if he
testified against Giglio, and the Assistant U.S. Attorney (“AUSA,” i.e.,
the federal prosecutor) told the jury that “‘(Taliento) received no
promises that he would not be indicted.’”118 Unbeknownst to the trial
AUSA, the prior AUSA handling the case had told Taliento that he
wouldn’t be prosecuted if he testified against Giglio before the grand
jury and at trial.119
Giglio’s appeal of his conviction eventually reached the United States
Supreme Court, which, inter alia, cited (1) Brady v. Maryland for the
proposition that the State has a duty to disclose material exculpatory
evidence;120 and (2) Napue v. Illinois to conclude that “[w]hen the
‘reliability of a given witness may well be determinative of guilt or
innocence,’ nondisclosure of evidence affecting credibility falls within
this general rule.”121 Applying this precedent to the case at hand, the
Giglio Court found that the promise made by the first AUSA was
attributable to the government even though the trial AUSA wasn’t aware
of it.122 The Court then concluded that this promise was material
impeachment evidence because “the Government’s case depended
almost entirely on Taliento’s testimony; without it there could have

113 See, e.g., State v. Coleman, 742 S.E.2d 346, 350 (N.C. Ct. App. 2013) (“It is
axiomatic that in a criminal trial when substantive evidence is admitted, it bears directly
upon the question of the defendant’s guilt or innocence.”).
114 Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972).
115 See, e.g., Sterkel v. Fruehauf Corp., 975 F.2d 528, 532 (8th Cir. 1992)
(“Impeachment is an attack on the credibility of a witness . . . .”).
116 See Brief for the United States at 2-3, Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972)
(No. 70-29), 1971 WL 133464, at *2-3.
117 See Giglio, 405 U.S. at 151.
118 Id. at 151-52.
119 See id. at 152.
120 See id. at 153.
121 Id. at 154.
122 See id.
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been no indictment and no evidence to carry the case to the jury.”123
Accordingly, the Giglio Court held that the non-disclosure of this
promise violated the Brady doctrine.124
In United States v. Bagley, the Supreme Court later observed that
Giglio obligates prosecutors to disclose material impeachment evidence
related to key Government witnesses.125 When defendants allege that
the State has failed to disclose material impeachment evidence, courts
frequently use phrases such as “Giglio evidence,”126 “Giglio rule,”127
“Giglio claim,”128 and “Giglio violation.”129
2.

United States v. Agurs

In its 1976 opinion in United States v. Agurs,130 the Supreme Court
again extended the Brady rule while at the same time noting that the
Brady opinion had combined the Supreme Court cases preceding it to
create one comprehensive rule. In Agurs, prostitute Linda Agurs fatally
stabbed her john, James Sewell, with a bowie knife after he caught her
emptying his wallet in their motel room.131 After Agurs was convicted
of second-degree murder, she appealed, claiming that the State had
suppressed evidence of Sewell’s violent criminal record, which would
have supported her claim of self-defense.132
In addressing Agurs’s claim, the Supreme Court initially held that
“[t]he rule of Brady v. Maryland . . . arguably applies in three quite
different situations. Each involves the discovery, after trial of
information which had been known to the prosecution but unknown to

123

Id. at 154-55.
See id. at 155.
125 See United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676-77 (1985).
126 See, e.g., United States v. Garcia, 562 F.3d 947, 952 n.7 (8th Cir. 2009)
(“However, the nondisclosure of Giglio evidence only justifies a retrial if the withheld
information is deemed material.”).
127 See, e.g., Smith v. Sec’y, Dept. of Corrs., 572 F.3d 1327, 1335 (11th Cir. 2009)
(“Accurate statements do not violate the Giglio rule.”).
128 See, e.g., Banks v. Dretke, 540 U.S. 668, 690 n.11 (2004) (“Because we conclude
that Banks qualifies for relief under Brady, we need not decide whether a Giglio claim,
to warrant adjudication, must be separately pleaded.”).
129 See, e.g., Barwick v. State, 88 So. 3d 85, 103 (Fla. 2011) (“To demonstrate a Giglio
violation, a defendant must prove that (1) the prosecutor presented or failed to correct
false testimony; (2) the prosecutor knew the testimony was false; and (3) the false
evidence was material.”).
130 United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
131 See id. at 99.
132 See id. at 100.
124
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the defense.”133 The first situation covered by the Brady rule is a case in
which the prosecution suborns perjury at trial, as typified by Mooney v.
Holohan.134 The second situation is the Brady case itself, in which the
defense makes a request for specific evidence — like Brady’s request all
of Boblit’s extrajudicial statements — and the State fails to produce
material exculpatory evidence.135
The third situation, which the Court was addressing in Agurs, is one
in which the prosecution fails to disclose material exculpatory evidence
in response to no request for exculpatory evidence or possibly a general
request for “all Brady material” or for “anything exculpatory.”136 The
Agurs Court concluded that the State does have a duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence in this third situation if that evidence is
“material.”137 The Court then explained that evidence is material “if the
omitted evidence creates a reasonable doubt that did not otherwise
exist.”138 Applying this standard to the case at hand, the Court reached
the following conclusion:
Since the arrest record was not requested and did not even
arguably give rise to any inference of perjury, since after
considering it in the context of the entire record the trial judge
remained convinced of [Agurs]’s guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt, and since we are satisfied that his firsthand appraisal of
the record was thorough and entirely reasonable, we hold that
the prosecutor’s failure to tender Sewell’s record to the defense
did not deprive respondent of a fair trial as guaranteed by the
Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.139
3.

United States v. Bagley

In its 1985 opinion in United States v. Bagley,140 the Supreme Court
answered the question of whether this same standard of “materiality”
applies in cases in which the defense makes a specific request for
impeachment evidence. In Bagley, Hughes Bagley was indicted on
fifteen charges of violating various firearms and narcotics statutes.141
133
134
135
136
137
138
139
140
141

Id. at 103 (citation omitted).
See id.
See id. at 104.
Id. at 106.
Id. at 107-14.
Id. at 112.
Id. at 114.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985).
See id. at 669.
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Before trial, defense counsel filed a discovery motion which asked for,
inter alia, “[t]he names and addresses of witnesses that the government
intends to call at trial. Also the prior criminal records of witnesses, and
any deals, promises or inducements made to witnesses in exchange for
their testimony.”142 In response, the State disclosed, inter alia,
information relating to its two principal witnesses but did not disclose
any “deals, promises or inducements” that had been made to them.143
After Bagley was convicted, he appealed, claiming that the State failed
to disclose that both of these witnesses had entered into a “Contract for
Purchase of Information and Payment of Lump Sum Therefor.”144 These
contracts each contained the following typed description of services:
That he will provide information regarding T-I and other
violations committed by Hughes A. Bagley, Jr.; that he will
purchase evidence for ATF; that he will cut [sic] in an
undercover capacity for ATF; that he will assist ATF in
gathering of evidence and testify against the violator in federal
court.145
At the bottom of these contracts, “[t]he figure ‘$300.00’ was
handwritten in each form on a line entitled ‘Sum to Be Paid to
Vendor.’”146
Bagley claimed that these contracts were material impeachment
evidence of incentivized testimony that the State failed to disclose in
response to a specific discovery request.147 As in Agurs, the district court
found that the disclosure of this impeachment evidence would not have
changed the outcome at trial.148 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit disagreed,
observing that “[s]tanding alone, the government’s failure to produce
requested Brady information is a serious due process violation.”149 The
court then added that “a failure to disclose requested Brady information
that the defendant could use to conduct an effective cross-examination
is even more egregious because it threatens the defendant’s right to
confront adverse witnesses, and therefore, his right to a fair trial.”150 As
a result, the court concluded “that the government’s failure to provide
142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150

Id. at 669-70.
Id. at 670.
Id. at 671-72.
Id. at 671.
Id.
See id. at 671-72.
See Bagley v. Lumpkin, 719 F.2d 1462, 1464 (9th Cir. 1983).
Id.
Id.
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requested Brady information to Bagley so that he could effectively crossexamine two important government witnesses requires an automatic
reversal.”151
The Supreme Court later disagreed with this holding. It noted that
“[t]he Court of Appeals treated impeachment evidence as
constitutionally different from exculpatory evidence” by holding that its
non-disclosure requires automatic reversal.152 The Bagley Court
rejected this reasoning, proclaiming that “[t]his Court has rejected any
such distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory
evidence.”153 As support, the Court cited to Giglio, in which it had
required a showing of materiality before finding that the non-disclosure
of impeachment evidence was a due process violation.154
The Bagley Court then added that the same test of materiality applies
in “no request,” “general request,” and “specific request” cases: “The
evidence is material only if there is a reasonable probability that, had
the evidence been disclosed to the defense, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.”155 Put another way, “[a] ‘reasonable
probability’ is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the
outcome.”156 The Court then remanded the case to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which held that the suppressed
contracts were material, meaning that Bagley had established a Brady
violation.157
While it might have seemed relatively unimportant at the time, as will
be discussed infra, the Court’s comparison of impeachment and
substantive evidence in Bagley has ended up playing an outsized rule in
determining whether there is a right to evidence before pleading guilty.
4.

Kyles v. Whitley

In its 1995 opinion in Kyles v. Whitley,158 the Supreme Court (1)
further clarified this materiality test; and (2) fleshed out the State’s duty
to discover favorable evidence that was established in Giglio. After his
first trial ended in a hung jury, Curtis Lee Kyles was convicted of the
first-degree murder of Dolores Dye in a New Orleans grocery store
151
152
153
154
155
156
157
158

Id.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
See id.
Id. at 677 (citing Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 154 (1972)).
Id. at 682.
Id.
See Bagley v. Lumpkin, 798 F.2d 1297, 1302 (9th Cir. 1986).
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
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parking lot in 1984.159 Kyles subsequently appealed, claiming that the
State suppressed six pieces of evidence, including exculpatory
eyewitness statements and “the computer print-out of license numbers
of cars parked at [the grocery store] on the night of the murder, which
did not list the number of Kyles’s car.”160
In finding a due process violation, the Kyles Court reached several
conclusions about the Brady test, including two that will be addressed
here. First, the Court held that “a showing of materiality does not
require demonstration by a preponderance that disclosure of the
suppressed evidence would have resulted ultimately in the defendant’s
acquittal.”161 Thus, while a defendant must establish a reasonable
probability that withheld evidence would have created a different
outcome at trial, he does not have to make this showing by a
preponderance of the evidence, i.e., does not have to show that it was
“more likely than not” the new evidence would have produced a
different outcome.162
Second, as noted, the Court in Giglio found a Brady violation based
upon the trial AUSA being unaware of a promise that the prior AUSA
had made to a witness for the prosecution.163 In other words, the Giglio
Court placed a duty on a trial prosecutor to learn about exculpatory
evidence connected to another prosecutor.164 In Kyles, the undisclosed
exculpatory evidence was in the possession of the police, who had not
turned it over to the prosecution.165 Nonetheless, the Court was able to
find a Brady violation by concluding “that the individual prosecutor has
a duty to learn of any favorable evidence known to the others acting on
the government’s behalf in the case, including the police.”166
Because the Court found a Brady violation, Kyles was given a new
trial.167 That new trial ended in a hung jury, as did two subsequent
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See id. at 421, 423.
Id. at 428-29.
161 Id. at 434.
162 Id.
163 See supra notes 122–124.
164 See, e.g., Sarah Anne Mourer, Believe It or Not: Mitigating the Negative Effects
Personal Belief and Bias Have on the Criminal Justice System, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1087,
1097 (2015) (“Brady and Giglio impose on the prosecution a duty to learn and disclose
to the defense all ‘favorable’ and ‘material’ information ‘known to the others acting on
the government’s behalf in the case.’”).
165 See Kyles, 514 U.S. at 437.
166 Id.
167 See id. at 454.
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trials.168 New Orleans District Attorney Harry Connick finally dismissed
the charges against Kyles in 1998, and he received $150,000 in state
compensation.169
As will be discussed infra, both of the Supreme Court’s holdings in
Kyles bear directly upon the questions of when and how a pre-plea right
to substantive evidence of innocence might be triggered.
5.

United States v. Ruiz

Finally, in its 2002 opinion in United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme
Court limited the scope of the Giglio right to material impeachment
evidence.170 In August 2009, Angela Ruiz attempted to enter the United
States at the Tecate Port of Entry while driving a 1970 Mercury Cougar;
inspection of the vehicle revealed 66.3 pounds of marijuana hidden
inside.171 Ruiz was thereafter charged with Importation of Marijuana
and offered a “fast track” plea bargain, which came with a two level
downward departure under the United States Sentencing Guidelines.172
The plea agreement (1) stated that “‘any [known] information
establishing the factual innocence of the defendant’ ‘has been turned
over to the defendant’” and “acknowledge[d] the Government’s
‘continuing duty to provide such information;’” but (2) required that
Ruiz “‘waiv[e] the right’ to receive ‘impeachment information relating
to any informants or other witnesses’ as well as the right to receive
information supporting any affirmative defense the defendant raises if
the case goes to trial.”173
Ruiz refused to sign the plea agreement and ended up pleading guilty
without the benefit of a plea bargain.174 At sentencing, she
unsuccessfully sought the same two-level downward departure that she
would have received under the plea deal.175 Ruiz thereafter appealed,
claiming that the plea bargain violated her pre-plea right to material
impeachment evidence.176 The Ninth Circuit agreed, concluding that a
168 See Maurice Possley, Curtis Kyles, NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS,
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Pages/casedetail.aspx?caseid=3366
[https://perma.cc/QKT6-U7KW] (last updated Oct. 28, 2015).
169 See id.
170 See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 633 (2002).
171 See Brief for Respondent in Opposition to United States’ Petition for Writ of
Certiorari at 2, United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622 (2002) (No. 01-595).
172 See Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 625.
173 Id.
174 See id. at 625-26.
175 See id. at 626.
176 See id.
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guilty plea is not voluntary “unless the prosecutors first made the same
disclosure of material impeachment information that the prosecutors
would have had to make had the defendant insisted upon a trial.”177
The Supreme Court, however, disagreed for three reasons. First, the
Court noted that “impeachment information is special in relation to the
fairness of a trial, not in respect to whether a plea is voluntary.”178
Second, the Court “found no legal authority embodied either in this
Court’s past cases or in cases from other circuits that provides
significant support for the Ninth Circuit’s decision”; instead, prior
precedent established that courts can accept guilty pleas “despite
various forms of misapprehension under which a defendant might
labor.”179 Third, the Court concluded that the clause in the rejected plea
agreement obligating the government to provide “any information
establishing the factual innocence of the defendant” diminished the
concern that, “in the absence of impeachment information, innocent
individuals, accused of crimes, will plead guilty.”180
III. RUIZ’S AFTERMATH AND THE ALLEGED LACK OF A CLEAR RIGHT TO
EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE BEFORE PLEADING GUILTY
A. Introduction
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Ruiz has led to a split among courts
over whether defendants have a right to substantive evidence of
innocence before pleading guilty.181 Courts concluding that there is no
right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty have focused on
two factors while courts recognizing such a right have downplayed
these two factors. The ensuing Sections will explore these factors and
explain how the split has made it especially difficult for defendants in
qualified immunity and federal habeas corpus actions.
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Id. at 629.
Id.
179 Id. at 630.
180 Id. at 631.
181 See, e.g., Walton v. State, 165 So. 3d 516, 524-25 (Miss. Ct. App. 2015) (citing
cases from the Second, Fourth, and Fifth Circuits to support its conclusion that “[s]ince
Ruiz, several cases have extended its holding to cases involving material exculpatory
evidence.”). See also Ion Meyn, Discovery and Darkness: The Information Deficit in
Criminal Disputes, 79 BROOK. L. REV. 1091, 1102 n.35 (2014) (“There is a split regarding
whether Ruiz applies only to impeachment evidence, or to any and all exculpatory
evidence.”).
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B. No Distinction Between Impeachment and Substantive Evidence
Courts finding no pre-plea right to substantive evidence of innocence
have argued that there is no distinction between impeachment evidence
and substantive evidence of innocence under Brady. Some of these
courts have focused on the Bagley Court’s statement that the Supreme
Court “has rejected any such distinction between impeachment
evidence and exculpatory evidence.”182 Other courts have alleged that
Ruiz itself created no distinction between these two types of evidence.183
According to these courts, because there is no pre-plea right to
impeachment evidence, there must also be no pre-plea right to
substantive evidence of innocence.184
For example, in United States v. Conroy, Pamela Conroy pleaded
guilty to fraud charges based upon statements she made to Federal
Emergency Management Agency (“FEMA”) about her home in the wake
of Hurricane Katrina.185 After her guilty plea, Conroy learned about a
previously undisclosed FBI interview of her friend Sandra Pierce.186
According to the FBI report on the interview, Pierce was present for
Conroy’s call to the FEMA representative, everything Conroy told the
representative was correct, and Conroy left the conversation believing
she qualified for FEMA funding.187 In finding no Brady violation, the
Fifth Circuit rejected Conroy’s argument that Ruiz only applies to
impeachment evidence and not substantive evidence of innocence.188

182 United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985). In its opinion in United States
v. Ruiz, 241 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. 2001), the Ninth Circuit cited this language from
Bagley, but for the opposite conclusion. The Ninth Circuit used this language to refute
the State’s claim “that impeachment evidence is only relevant if there is going to be a
trial.” Id. at 1166. The Supreme Court did not cite this language from Bagley in reversing
the Ninth Circuit’s opinion. See generally Ruiz, 536 U.S. 662.
183 See, e.g., United States v. Ware, No. 3:13-CR-26-GFVT-REW-1, 2016 WL
9276026, at *6 n.6 (E.D. Ky. July 26, 2016) (“The Court finds any possible distinction,
as to Ruiz, between impeachment and exculpatory evidence problematic for several
reasons.”).
184 See, e.g., Clark v. Lewis, No. 2:12-cv-2687 TLN GGH, 2014 WL 1665224, at *8
(E.D. Cal. Apr. 25, 2014) (“Therefore, in light of Ruiz and Bagley, whether the evidence
proffered by petitioner is viewed as exculpatory or impeachment material, petitioner’s
Brady claim fails.”); Barclay v. Chappell, No. 2:13-cv-1489 GGH P, 2014 WL 931867,
at *6 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 2014) (same); Ransaw v. Lucas, No. 1:09 CV 02332, 2013 WL
6179418, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 25, 2013) (agreeing with the magistrate that Bagley
and Ruiz mean that there is no pre-plea right to substantive evidence of innocence).
185 See United States v. Conroy, 567 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 2009).
186 See id. at 176-77.
187 See id.
188 See id. at 179.
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According to the court, “Ruiz never makes such a distinction nor can
this proposition be implied from its discussion.”189
Conversely, courts recognizing a right to evidence of innocence
before pleading guilty have found that the Ruiz Court held or implied
that there is a distinction between impeachment evidence and
substantive evidence of innocence. For example, in Buffey v. Ballard,
Joseph Buffey pleaded guilty to two counts of sexual assault and one
count of robbery in West Virginia pursuant to a plea agreement.190
Before Buffey entered his plea, the State failed to disclose that a
lieutenant had reached the following conclusion regarding DNA testing:
“[A]ssuming there are only two contributors (including [the victim]),
Joseph Buffey is excluded as the donor of the seminal fluid identified
[from the rape kit] cuttings.”191
The Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia found that the State’s
failure to disclose this evidence was a Brady violation by concluding
that, if this evidence had been disclosed, (1) Buffey would neither have
pleaded guilty nor been told to plead guilty; and (2) the jury would not
have convicted him.192 In reaching this conclusion, the court held that
“the Court in Ruiz specifically distinguished impeachment evidence
from exculpatory evidence.”193 According to the Supreme Court of
Appeals of West Virginia, the Ruiz “Court noted that impeachment
evidence differs from exculpatory evidence because it is not ‘critical
information of which the defendant must always be aware prior to
pleading guilty given the random way in which such information may,
or may not, help a particular defendant.’”194 Some state and federal
courts have reached similar conclusions.195
C. No Established Precedent Creating a Right to Evidence of Innocence
Before Pleading Guilty
Courts that have found no pre-plea right to substantive evidence of
innocence have often focused on the fact that there is no established
189

Id.
See Buffey v. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d 204, 206 (W. Va. 2015).
191 Id. at 208.
192 See id. at 220-21.
193 Id. at 213 (emphasis omitted).
194 Id. (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 630 (2002)).
195 See, e.g., United States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005); McCann
v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 787-88 (7th Cir. 2003); Ex parte Saucedo, 576 S.W.3d
712, 716-17 (Tex. Crim. App. 2019); State v. Huebler, 275 P.3d 91, 97-98 (Nev. 2012)
(“In our opinion, the considerations that led to the decision in Ruiz do not lead to the
same conclusion when it comes to material exculpatory information.”).
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precedent creating a right to evidence of innocence before pleading
guilty. As noted, in the Alvarez case from the introduction, the Fifth
Circuit rejected a claim that the State violated the Brady doctrine by
failing to disclose an exculpatory video to a ninth grade, special
education student before he pleaded guilty to assaulting a peace
officer.196 And, as noted, it reached this conclusion by finding that “case
law from the Supreme Court, this circuit, and other circuits does not
affirmatively establish that a constitutional violation occurs when Brady
material is not shared during the plea bargaining process.”197 Similarly,
in United States v. Mathur, the First Circuit rejected a defendant’s claim
that Brady applies to the plea bargaining process, noting that “[h]e does
not cite a single case standing for this novel approach but, rather, relies
on authority extolling the importance of plea negotiations.”198
The alleged lack of any precedent regarding a pre-plea right to
evidence of innocence has most frequently hurt defendants in two
contexts. The first context is the qualified immunity context.
Defendants bringing civil actions against state officials for Brady
violations must overcome claims of qualified immunity by establishing
that (1) the official’s conduct violated a statutory or constitutional right;
and (2) this right was “clearly established at the time of the challenged
conduct.”199 Defendants bringing such actions have difficulty
establishing the second part of this test due to the lack of case law clearly
establishing the pre-plea right to material exculpatory evidence.
For example, in Robertson v. Lucas, several Ohio defendants pleaded
guilty to drug crimes in connection with Operation Turnaround, “a
highly corrupt government investigation in which an informant, inter
alia, maliciously falsely identified innocent people as participants in
drug sales and stole controlled ‘buy money’ from DEA agents.”200 After
the corrupt nature of Operation Turnaround was revealed, the
prosecutor successfully moved for the dismissal of the defendants’
convictions.201 The defendants then brought Section 1983 actions,
claiming that the failure of various state officials to disclose material
exculpatory evidence connected to Operation Turnaround before they
pleaded guilty violated the Brady doctrine.202 The Sixth Circuit,
however, found that these officials had qualified immunity because they
196
197
198
199
200
201
202

See Alvarez v. City of Brownsville, 904 F.3d 382, 389 (5th Cir. 2018).
See id. at 394.
United States v. Mathur, 624 F.3d 498, 506-07 (1st Cir. 2010).
Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012).
Robertson v. Lucas, 753 F.3d 606, 626 (6th Cir. 2014) (Keith, J., concurring).
See id. at 613.
See id.
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“were under no clearly established obligation to disclose exculpatory
Brady material to the prosecutors in time to be put to effective use in
plea bargaining.”203 Other courts in qualified immunity cases have
reached the same conclusion.204
The second context is the habeas context. When a defendant loses an
appeal of his conviction in state court, he can file a petition for writ of
habeas corpus in federal court, claiming that the state court proceedings
“resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States.”205 Again, the alleged lack of
established precedent establishing a pre-plea right to Brady evidence has
hurt defendants in the habeas context.
For example, in Carter v. Hobbs, Nickol Carter pleaded guilty to
robbery and related crimes and later unsuccessfully appealed his
convictions in state court in Arkansas.206 Carter thereafter filed a
petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal court, arguing, inter alia,
that the State withheld substantive evidence of his innocence, including
(1) fingerprint reports from the crime scenes that did not match
his fingerprints; (2) the lack of crime lab analysis of certain
evidence recovered from the crime scenes; (3) inconsistent
witness statements; (4) a DNA test from a crime-scene cigarette
butt that did not match his DNA; and (5) a witness who was
presented a photo lineup and identified another individual as
the perpetrator.207
In denying Carter relief, the court noted that “[f]irst and foremost,
Petitioner’s claim fails because there is no clearly established
constitutional right to the disclosure of Brady material prior to the entry
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Id. at 621-22.
See, e.g., Warren v. City of Birmingham, No. 2:09-CV-1025-RRA, 2010 WL
11469568, at *6 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 13, 2010) (granting an official qualified immunity
because “[t]here is a substantial question of law as to whether, at the relevant time, a
police officer was on notice that he would violate a criminal defendant’s due process
rights by withholding materially exculpatory evidence when the criminal defendant
pleads guilty rather than proceeds to trial”).
205 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2019).
206 See Carter v. Hobbs, No. 5:10CV00346 JMM/JTR, 2013 WL 1668988, at *1 (E.D.
Ark. Mar. 25, 2013).
207 Id. at *5 n.5.
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of a guilty plea.”208 Other courts addressing similar claims have reached
the same conclusion.209
Conversely, courts finding a clearly established pre-plea right to
material exculpatory evidence have argued that Brady created such a
right and that Ruiz did not circumscribe that right. For example, in
United States v. Nelson, Gregory Nelson pleaded guilty to traveling from
Virginia to D.C. to engage in illicit sexual contact with an undercover
detective he believed to be a minor.210 Nelson’s claim was that he
traveled to D.C. to buy methamphetamine, a claim that was bolstered
by an undisclosed email in which the detective discussed his possession
of methamphetamine with Nelson.211 Upon learning that the State had
documentation of this email after his plea, Nelson appealed, claiming a
Brady violation.212 The United States District Court for the District of
Columbia agreed with him, finding that if this evidence had been
disclosed before Nelson’s plea, “he would have taken his chances at trial
to show that he was a drug abuser looking to score, and not someone
intending to abuse a child.”213
In reaching this conclusion, the court noted that the Brady Court was
not narrowly concerned about avoiding unfair trials and instead more
broadly “expressed a general resolve to ensure that justice is served.”214
Accordingly, “precluding a defendant from raising such a Brady claim
after a guilty plea could create a risk too costly to the integrity of the
system of justice to countenance . . . .”215 Moreover, the court noted that
the Ruiz Court “drew a significant distinction between impeachment
and exculpatory evidence and did not decide whether a defendant is
entitled to exculpatory evidence at the guilty plea stage.”216 Indeed, the
court went on to find that “[i]f anything, Ruiz’s discussion about the
importance of the government disclosing evidence that may establish a
defendant’s innocence suggests that, if confronted with the issue, the
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Id. at *5.
See, e.g., Jones v. Bryant, 27 F. App’x. 669, 701 (7th Cir. 2001) (“The Supreme
Court’s decisions do not clearly establish that prosecutors must reveal exculpatory
information before trial, so under § 2254(d)(1) Jones is not entitled to relief on federal
collateral attack.”).
210 See United States v. Nelson, 979 F. Supp. 2d 123, 126 (D.D.C. 2013).
211 See id.
212 See id. at 127.
213 Id. at 135.
214 Id. at 130.
215 Id.
216 Id. at 129.
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Supreme Court would hold that a defendant has a constitutional right
to exculpatory evidence at the guilty plea stage.”217
D. Conclusion
In summation, some courts have held that Brady can be read as
creating a pre-plea right to substantive evidence of innocence that was
not circumscribed by Ruiz. Conversely, other courts have concluded
that (1) neither Brady nor any other Supreme Court opinion established
a pre-plea right to evidence of innocence; and (2) Ruiz can be read to
foreclose any alleged right to evidence of innocence before pleading
guilty.
In order to establish that there is a clear right to evidence of innocence
before pleading guilty, two propositions must therefore be correct: (1)
Wilde v. Wyoming created such a right; and (2) United States v. Ruiz did
not circumscribe that right. The next two Parts will address these two
propositions.
IV. WILDE V. WYOMING CREATED A RIGHT TO EVIDENCE OF INNOCENCE
BEFORE PLEADING GUILTY
A. Current Viability of Brady’s Progenitors
1.

Introduction

As noted, in Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court stated that its new
Brady doctrine was merely an “extension” of Mooney v. Holohan and its
progeny.218 Commentators have picked up on this “extension”
language. For example, Professor Lissa Griffin observed that the Brady
“Court suggested that its decision was merely an extension of earlier
decisions concerning a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial, such
as Mooney v. Holohan . . . .”219 And Professor Bennett L. Gershman
classified the Brady opinion as “peculiar” because “[t]he Court
suggested that its decision in Brady was merely an ‘extension’ of earlier
decisions concerning a defendant’s due process right to a fair trial.”220
217

Id. at 129 n.4.
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1963) (noting that “[t]his ruling is an
extension of Mooney,” which itself was extended in subsequent opinions).
219 Lissa Griffin, Pretrial Procedures for Innocent People: Reforming Brady, 56 N.Y.L.
SCH. L. REV. 969, 976 n.44 (2011).
220 Bennett L. Gershman, Reflections on Brady v. Maryland, 47 S. TEX. L. REV. 685,
693 (2006). Professor Gershman goes on to note that those earlier opinions were
Mooney, Pyle, Napue, Alcorta, Wilde, and Durley (Douglas, J., dissenting). Id. at 693 n.36.
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University of California, Davis

300

[Vol. 53:271

Lower courts also have honed in on this “extension” language. For
example, in Drumgold v. Callahan, the First Circuit noted that “Brady
was an ‘extension’ of a line of cases beginning with Mooney v. Holohan
. . . and Pyle v. Kansas . . . in which the Supreme Court held that a state
actor violates a criminal defendant’s due process rights by the knowing
use of perjured testimony or the deliberate suppression of evidence
leading to the defendant’s conviction.”221 In this sense, Brady only
“broke new ground in holding that a prosecutor also violates a
defendant’s due process rights merely by failing to disclose material
evidence in his possession that is favorable to the defendant,
irrespective of the good or bad faith of the prosecutor.”222
Indeed, in a piece for Federal Rules Decisions a year after Brady was
decided, a federal judge observed that
[a]lthough the Supreme court in its decision treats its holding
as merely an extension of its decisions in Mooney v. Holohan . . .
and Pyle v. State of Kansas . . . defense counsel have seized upon
the Brady case as a complete innovation and have made it the
basis for motions prior to trial to inspect all evidence in the
hands of the prosecution favorable to the accused on the issues
of guilt or punishment.223
The Supreme Court eventually addressed one of these motions in its
1967 opinion in Giles v. Maryland.224 In Giles, the Court grappled with
the question of whether the Brady doctrine applies in the absence of a
defense request for exculpatory evidence.225 There was no majority
opinion in Giles, but there was a sharp divide between Justice Fortas’
opinion concurring in the judgment and Justice Harlan’s dissenting
opinion. Justice Fortas (1) argued that Brady had extended the Mooney
line of cases by holding the suppression of favorable evidence violates
due process regardless of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution;
and (2) saw “no reason to make th[is] result turn on the adventitious
circumstance of a request.”226 Meanwhile, Justice Harlan could not
“agree that this Court in Brady extended Mooney in any fashion.”227
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Drumgold v. Callahan, 707 F.3d 28, 38 (1st Cir. 2013).
Id.
223 Honorable James M. Carter, Suppression of Evidence Favorable to an Accused, 34
F.R.D. 87 (1964).
224 Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66 (1967).
225 See id. at 67-68.
226 Id. at 101-02 (Fortas, J., concurring).
227 Id. at 117 n.9 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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As noted, in United States v. Agurs, a majority of the Court would later
find that Brady does apply in the absence of a defense request for
exculpatory evidence.228 In reaching this conclusion, the Agurs majority
twice cited to Justice Fortas’ Giles concurrence,229 seemingly
corroborating his claim that Brady was merely an extension of the
Mooney line of cases, with its sole innovation being to make the good
faith or bad faith of the State irrelevant.
Under this reading, the Mooney line of cases takes on added
importance. If Brady merely extended Mooney and its progeny, those
cases are illustrations of ways in which the State can violate the Due
Process Clause, even if those cases did not grant relief. Such a reading
is corroborated by the Supreme Court’s subsequent opinion in Agurs.
As noted, the Agurs Court held that “[t]he rule of Brady v. Maryland . . .
arguably applies in three quite different situations.”230 The Court then
noted that the first situation involved the subornation of perjury and
was typified by Mooney v. Holohan and also illustrated by, inter alia, Pyle
v. Kansas, Alcorta v. Texas, and Napue v. Illinois.231 This reading of these
cases seems consistent with both pre-Brady and post-Brady precedent
citing these opinions to find due process violations despite the differing
procedural postures of these cases.
2.

Mooney v. Holohan

As noted, Mooney v. Holohan was a per curiam opinion in which the
Court denied the defendant relief but noted in dicta that the knowing
subornation of perjury can violate the Due Process Clause.232 The
Supreme Court has since cited Mooney ninety-nine times, and, despite
the Mooney Court denying the defendant relief, courts have frequently
cited Mooney to find that the knowing subornation of perjury can violate
the Due Process Clause.
For instance, in its 1999 opinion in Limone v. Condon, the First Circuit
denied relief to state agents seeking qualified immunity from a
petitioner’s claim that they knowingly suborned perjury.233 In denying
228

See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 109 (1976).
See id. at 109 n.16, 120. The Agurs Court also noted that Brady “expressly rejected
the good faith or the bad faith of the prosecutor as the controlling consideration.” Id. at
110 n.17.
230 Id. at 103.
231 See id. at 103, n.8.
232 See, e.g., United States v. Ohiri, 133 F. App’x. 555, 562 (10th Cir. 2005) (finding
that Ruiz’s reasoning justifies distinguishing substantive evidence of innocence from
impeachment evidence).
233 See Limone v. Condon, 372 F.3d 39, 43 (1st Cir. 2004).
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qualified immunity, the court proclaimed that Mooney created “a duty
to refrain from procuring convictions by the presentation of testimony
known to be perjurious. . . .”234 Indeed, the court noted that as early as
1951, it had “described Mooney’s core premise as ‘well-settled.’”235
Courts sometimes combine the Supreme Court’s opinion in Mooney
with its subsequent opinion in Napue v. Illinois in cases involving
alleged subornation of perjury to refer to a “Mooney-Napue claim”236 or
a “Mooney-Napue violation.”237 Other courts add the Supreme Court’s
opinion in Pyle v. Kansas to talk about the “Mooney-Pyle-Napue line of
decisions.”238
3.

Pyle v. Kansas

Courts have also continued to cite Pyle v. Kansas when presented with
claims that prosecutors suborned perjury and/or suppressed material
exculpatory evidence. And they have done so despite the fact that the
United States Supreme Court merely remanded Henry Pyle’s case to the
Supreme Court of Kansas, which ultimately found neither subornation
of perjury nor suppression of evidence.239 There are at least four
important observations concerning these continued citations. First, as
just noted, despite the Pyle Court merely remanding, courts have cited
to the “Mooney-Pyle-Napue line of decisions” to find due process
violations based on the subornation of perjury.240
Second, courts also cite Pyle by itself to find that the knowing
subornation of perjury violates the Due Process Clause. For example, in
United States ex rel. Jones v. Franzen, the petitioner brought a habeas
petition claiming that the State knowingly suborned perjury.241 In
remanding the district court’s summary dismissal of the petition, the
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Id. at 47.
Id. at 45 (quoting Coggins v. O’Brien, 188 F.2d 130, 138 (1st Cir. 1951)).
236 See, e.g., Morris v. Ylst, 447 F.3d 735, 743 n.7 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting United
States v. Zuno-Arce, 339 F.3d 886, 889 (9th Cir. 2003) (“For convenience, we refer to
Petitioner’s argument as a ‘Mooney-Napue claim.’”).
237 See, e.g., United States v. Houston, 648 F.3d 806, 814 (9th Cir. 2011) (“The
government’s failure to correct testimony that it later learns is perjured is also a MooneyNapue violation.”).
238 Ramirez v. State, 96 S.W.3d 386, 394 (Tex. App. 2002) (“This line of cases has
sometimes been referred to as the Mooney-Pyle-Napue line of decisions.”).
239 See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213, 216 (1942).
240 See, e.g., Condon, 372 F.3d at 45 (quoting Coggins v. O’Brien, 188 F.2d 130, 138
(1st Cir. 1951)).
241 See United States ex rel. Jones v. Franzen, 676 F.2d 261, 263 (7th Cir. 1982).
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Seventh Circuit held that “[a]s in Pyle v. Kansas . . . the perjury
allegation here has been neither ‘refuted nor denied . . . .’”242
Third, even though Pyle dealt primarily with perjury and only
tangentially dealt with an unsubstantiated claim of suppressed
evidence, courts frequently cite it in the latter context. As the Fifth
Circuit noted in United States v. DeVoe, “Pyle has been construed to
mean that the ‘suppression of evidence favorable’ to the accused is in
itself sufficient to constitute denial of due process.”243
Fourth, the Supreme Court has cited Pyle twenty-six times, including
in all of its important post-Brady opinions.244
4.

Durley v. Mayo

As noted, in Durley v. Mayo, a majority of the Supreme Court found
that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Dan Durley’s claim that the State’s
unknowing subornation of perjury violated due process.245 In his
dissenting opinion however, Justice Douglas held that the denial of a
hearing on Durley’s habeas petition deprived him of due process of
law.246 The Brady Court ultimately used a “Cf.” citation in reference to
this dissenting opinion.247
Given that this was merely a dissenting opinion, it is unsurprising
that a majority of courts have not since found that the unknowing
subornation of perjury violates due process. As the Supreme Court of
New Mexico noted in Case v. Hatch, “[a] majority of the federal circuit
courts require a knowing use of perjured testimony by the prosecution
to find a violation of due process.”248 That said, the Supreme Court of
New Mexico ended up finding that the unknowing subornation of
perjury can support a due process violation after noting that Justice
Douglas’ dissenting opinion in Durley “would have held that
‘[d]eprivation of a [habeas corpus] hearing under these circumstances

242

Id. at 266.
United States v. DeVoe, 489 F.2d 158, 160 (5th Cir. 1974).
244 See Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 281 n.19 (1999); Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S.
419, 432 (1995); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 693 (1985); United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 103 n.8 (1976); Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 153 (1972);
Giles v. Maryland, 386 U.S. 66, 73 (1967).
245 Durley v. Mayo, 351 U.S. 277, 285 (1956).
246 Id. at 290-91 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
247 Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
248 Case v. Hatch, 183 P.3d 905, 910 (N.M. 2008).
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amounts . . . to a denial of due process of law.’”249 Similarly, the Second
Circuit cited the Durley dissent to reach the same result.250
The United States Supreme Court has never adopted the holding of
the Durley dissent, but it has flirted with it twice when asked to stay
executions. In Edwards v. New York, the Court was asked to stay an
execution based on the claim, inter alia, that the State had unknowingly
suborned perjury from the defendant’s alleged accomplice.251 In
denying the stay, the Court acknowledged that the Durley dissent held
“that in some circumstances the innocent use of perjured testimony
might involve a denial of due process.”252 But the Edwards Court
ultimately found that “[t]he circumstances in Durley . . . bear no
resemblance to the situation presented here.”253
Later, in 1995, the Supreme Court was asked to stay the execution of
Jesse Dewayne Jacobs, who confessed to fatally shooting Etta Urdiales;
Jacobs’ confession was read at his trial.254 The State subsequently
prosecuted Jacobs’ alleged accomplice, Bobbie Hogan, and called Jacobs,
who testified that it was Hogan who shot Urdiales.255 Several police
officers also testified “that portions of Jacobs’ confession were
untrue.”256 The prosecutor ultimately explained to the jury that his
theory of the case had changed and that he now believed that Hogan
shot Urdiales and that Jacobs “did not in any way anticipate that the
victim would be shot.”257
Justices Stevens and Ginsburg dissented from the decision not to
grant the stay of execution, noting that Justice Douglas’ dissenting
opinion in Durley would have found a due process violation based on
similar facts.258 Indeed, the dissenting justices observed that “[h]ere, the
facts are far stronger than in Durley, as the State itself has formally
vouched for the credibility of Jacobs’ recantation of his confession and
police officers have testified, under oath, that parts of Jacobs’ confession
were false.”259
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Id. (emphasis added).
See Sanders v. Sullivan, 863 F.2d 218, 223 (2d Cir. 1988).
See Edwards v. New York, 76 S. Ct. 1058, 1059 (1956).
Id. at 1062 n.2.
Id.
See Jacobs v. Scott, 513 U.S. 1067, 1067 (1995).
See id. at 1067-68 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1069.
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See id. at 1070.
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Alcorta v. Texas

Alcorta v. Texas was one of the two cases cited by the Brady Court in
which a defendant was given relief. As noted, the Alcorta Court granted
the defendant a new trial based upon the prosecutor’s own admission
that he had knowingly solicited and failed to correct false testimony by
a key State’s witness.260 Understandably, then, the Supreme Court has
cited Alcorta eleven times, and lower courts have used Alcorta to
support their findings that the knowing failure to correct false
testimony is a due process violation.
For example, in Hayes v. Brown, the prosecutor “knowingly presented
false evidence to the jury and made false representations to the trial
judge as to whether the State had agreed not to prosecute [the
defendant’s accomplice] on his pending felony charges.”261 In finding a
due process violation, the Ninth Circuit held that “Alcorta . . . involved
a case quite similar to the one at bar” and compelled the finding that
the prosecutor violated the Due Process Clause.262
6.

Napue v. Illinois

Napue v. Illinois was the second case cited by the Brady Court in
which a defendant was given relief.263 As noted, the Napue Court found
that a prosecutor violated due process by failing to correct unexpected
false testimony regarding a plea agreement by a State’s witness.264 Napue
has since become “the leading perjury case,”265 with the Supreme Court
citing it forty times.
Lower courts have also frequently cited Napue in perjury cases. For
example, in Jenkins v. Artuz, Eric Jenkins was convicted of seconddegree murder and criminal possession of a weapon.266 This conviction
was secured largely through the testimony of a witness for the
prosecution who falsely testified that he wasn’t testifying pursuant to a
plea agreement.267 In finding a due process violation, the Second Circuit
cited to Napue and concluded that “[t]he case at bar presents similar

260

See Alcorta v. Texas, 355 U.S. 28, 31-32 (1957).
See Hayes v. Brown, 399 F.3d 972, 978 (9th Cir. 2005).
262 Id. at 983; cf. United States v. MacDonald, 778 F. Supp. 1342, 1354-55 (E.D. N.C.
1991) (examining Alcorta, 355 U.S. 28).
263 See Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264 (1959).
264 See id. at 272.
265 State v. Ayo, 7 So. 3d 85, 98 (La. Ct. App. 2009).
266 See Jenkins v. Artuz, 294 F.3d 284, 289 (2d Cir. 2002).
267 See id. at 293.
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facts” because Jenkins’ prosecutor also did not correct the witness’ false
testimony.268
7.

Wilde v. Wyoming

As noted, in Wilde v. Wyoming, the Supreme Court remanded a
defendant’s claim that he was induced into pleading guilty to seconddegree murder based on the suppression of two eyewitness statements
and the denial of his right to counsel.269 As in Pyle v. Kansas, the
Supreme Court remanded the case for further proceedings to determine
whether there was a due process violation.270
In the fourteen years after Wilde was issued, courts cited the case
twelve times. For example, in 1962, the Court of Appeals of Maryland
remanded a decision denying postconviction relief to a petitioner who
claimed that the State suppressed material exculpatory evidence.271 The
court largely based the decision to remand on prior precedent holding
that “the suppression by the State of evidence tending to exculpate a
defendant is a ground for relief.”272 That prior precedent was two cases:
Wilde v. Wyoming and the Court of Appeals’ own prior opinion in Brady
v. State,273 which was later affirmed in Brady v. Maryland.274
A couple of years later, in 1964, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit relied upon Wilde to reverse a robbery conviction
based upon the State’s suppression of two exculpatory statements by
eyewitnesses.275 In granting the defendant relief, the court noted the
similarity between the case at hand and Wilde, where an evidentiary
hearing was granted based on the petitioner’s allegation “that the
prosecutor wilfully suppressed the testimony of two eyewitnesses to the
alleged crime which would have exonerated the petitioner.”276
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Id.
See Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607, 607 (1960) (per curiam).
270 See id.
271 See Strosnider v. Warden of Md. Penitentiary, 180 A.2d 854, 856-57 (Md. 1962).
272 Id. at 856 (citations omitted).
273 See Brady v. State, 174 A.2d 167, 169-72 (Md. 1961) (“The suppression or
withholding by the State of material evidence exculpatory to an accused is a violation
of due process.”).
274 See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963) (“We now hold that the
suppression by the prosecution of evidence favorable to an accused upon request
violates due process where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution.”).
275 See United States ex rel. Meers v. Wilkins, 326 F.2d 135, 135-36, 138, 140 (2nd
Cir. 1964).
276 Id. (quoting Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607, 607 (1960)).
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During this stretch of fourteen years, courts would often cite Wilde
and Pyle in conjunction as the pre-Brady cases standing for the
proposition that the suppression of favorable evidence can violate due
process.277 The Seventh Circuit was the last court to cite Wilde during
this fourteen-year stretch, in its 1974 opinion in Christman v.
Hanrahan.278 In Christman, the court traced the history of the Brady
doctrine, noting how the Brady Court started by citing to Mooney v.
Holohan and then created the Brady doctrine “[a]fter reviewing later
cases in which it is fair to state that the entire proceedings were
fundamentally unfair”: Pyle v. Kansas, Napue v. Illinois, Alcorta v. Texas,
and Wilde v. Wyoming.279
But then, the Wilde opinion disappeared. Between 1975 and 2016, not
a single court cited Wilde. This streak was finally broken in December
2017, when the Court of Criminal Appeals of Alabama collaterally
quoted Wilde as part of a block quote to Brady.280 Wilde’s four-decade
absence from court opinions is surprising given that both defendants
and the State continue to cite it in their briefs. Most recently, last year,
an appellant convicted of murder cited to Wilde in his brief to the
Supreme Court of Florida to establish his claim that the suppression of
material exculpatory evidence constituted a Giglio violation.281 A year
earlier, a defendant cited Wilde in support of a claim to the Fourth
Circuit that the State violated the Brady doctrine by withholding an
alternate suspect’s confession.282 Meanwhile, states have even cited to

277 See, e.g., United States v. Mayersohn, 452 F.2d 521, 526 (2nd Cir. 1971) (citing
Pyle and Wilde for the proposition “that the suppression of evidence is a violation of
due process.”); United States v. Soblen, 203 F. Supp. 542, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 1961) (citing
Pyle and Wilde the proposition that “[a] new trial or a writ in the nature of habeas corpus
or coram nobis will be granted where the prosecutor has deliberately suppressed material
facts under circumstances amounting to fraud or overreaching of the defendant.”).
278 500 F.2d 65, 67 n.1 (7th Cir. 1974).
279 Id. at 67.
280 See State v. Martin, CR-15-0664, 2017 WL 6398318, at *17 (Ala. Crim. App. Dec.
15, 2017), rev’d sub nom. Ex parte State, No. 1170407, 2018 WL 4177525 (Ala. Aug. 31,
2018).
281 See Initial Brief of Appellant, Thomas v. State, 260 So.3d 226 (Fla. 2018) (No.
SC18-48), 2018 WL 2740354, at *54 n.39 (“In Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607 (1960),
the validity of a guilty plea was called into question in part because of the allegation that
‘the prosecutor willfully suppressed the testimony of two eyewitnesses to the alleged
crime which would have exonerated the petitioner.’”).
282 See Informal Brief for Habeas and Section 2255 Cases, United States v. Gibbs, 690
F. App’x 130 (4th Cir. 2017) (mem.) (No. 17-6135), 2017 WL 971760, at *11-12 (citing
Wilde in support of a claim that the State violated the Brady doctrine by withholding an
alternate suspect’s confession).
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Wilde to argue that the evidence it suppressed was less exculpatory than
the evidence in Wilde.283
Defendants have also continued to cite Wilde in support of claims that
the pre-plea suppression of favorable substantive evidence violates the
Brady doctrine. For example, in 2013, Alan Combs cited Wilde in his
brief to the Supreme Court of Washington to claim that the State
violated the Brady doctrine by suppressing favorable fingerprint
evidence prior to his nolo contendere plea.284 And, in 1992, Douglas
Thomas used Wilde in his brief to the Supreme Court of Virginia to
support his claim that the State committed a Brady violation by
suppressing evidence that could have supported an involuntary
intoxication defense prior to his guilty plea.285 Neither of these courts,
however, ended up addressing Wilde or even the merits of either
defendant’s Brady claim.286 Instead, as noted, no court cited Wilde
between 1975 and 2016.
So, how did Wilde go from being cited next to its Brady peers as late
as 1974 to being relegated to the dustbin of history? There’s no clear
answer. One possibility comes in the form of the Supreme Court’s 1976
opinion in United States v. Agurs.287 In Agurs, the Court created a kind
of unified theory of Brady, finding that it applied in “three quite
different situations.”288 One situation was the Agurs case itself, with the
State suppressing exculpatory evidence that wasn’t requested (or
specifically requested) by the defense.289 Another situation is the
suppression of exculpatory evidence requested by the defense, which
the Agurs Court illustrated solely through the Brady case.290 Finally, the
other situation is the subornation of perjury, which the Agurs Court
283 See, e.g., Reply Brief of Appellant, Angelone v. Dabney, 560 S.E.2d 253 (Va. 2002)
(No. 011069), 2001 WL 34899214, at *4-5 (reply brief by the State claiming that the
petitioner had not presented the same type of suppressed exculpatory evidence as the
petitioner in Wilde).
284 See Appellants Opening Brief, Combs v. State, 311 P.3d 443 (Mont. 2013) (No.
DA 12-0392), 2012 WL 5024989, at *i, iv.
285 See Opening Brief, Thomas v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 606 (Va. 1992) (No.
911850), 1992 WL 12157503, at *20-23.
286 See Combs v. State, 311 P.3d 443 (Mont. May 28, 2013) (unpublished); Thomas
v. Commonwealth, 419 S.E.2d 606 (Va. 1992), abrogated by Haugen v. Shenandoah
Valley Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 645 S.E.2d 261 (Va. 2007). In Thomas, the Supreme Court
of Virginia handled the defendant’s claim as a claim of destruction of evidence under
Arizona v. Youngblood, 488 U.S. 51 (1988), rather than a claim of suppression of
evidence under Brady. Thomas, 419 S.E.2d at 615.
287 See United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97 (1976).
288 Id. at 103-06.
289 See id. at 106-07.
290 See id. at 104-06.
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noted was typified by seven cases, including Mooney v. Holohan, Pyle v.
Kansas, Alcorta v. Texas, and Napue v. Illinois.291
One theory is that courts consulted Agurs rather than Brady in
subsequent cases, explaining Wilde’s omission from later opinions
because Wilde was not cited in Agurs. This theory finds some support
in precedent. About a month after Agurs, the Court of Criminal Appeals
of Oklahoma did not mention Wilde but (1) noted that Agurs clarified
the Brady doctrine; and (2) cited the same opinions cited in Agurs in
adjudicating a defendant’s claim that the State violated “the doctrine
enunciated in Brady v. Maryland.”292 Later that same year, an appellate
court in Illinois traced the history of the Brady doctrine from Mooney
through Pyle, Alcorta, and Napue, omitting Wilde.293 Then, the next
year, the Supreme Court of Colorado noted that “[i]n a long line of
cases, the United States Supreme Court has ruled that the suppression
of material evidence, favorable to the defendant and relating either to
guilt or punishment, is a denial of due process which requires reversal
of a conviction.”294 That “long line” again omitted Wilde but included
Mooney, Pyle, Alcorta, Napue, Brady, and “[t]he Supreme Court’s latest
pronouncement on this subject i[n] United States v. Agurs.”295 It thus
seems plausible that the Agurs Court’s failure to cite Wilde led to its
banishment.
Another possible explanation is the lack of available information
about the Wilde case. As noted, until recently, the only publicly
available information about Wilde was the Supreme Court’s one
paragraph per curiam opinion, which reveals next to nothing about the
facts of the case. And, as noted in the last several Subsections, courts
frequently cite the other Supreme Court cases referenced in Brady to
resolve disputes involving analogous factual contexts.296 In the absence
of a factual record in Wilde, such analogies are difficult. Additionally,
without further facts, it is difficult to tell whether the suppression
allegation in Wilde was a major or minor part of the petitioner’s claim.
To answer pertinent questions about Wilde, I tracked down twentytwo pages of documents connected to the case that had been

291
292
293
294
295
296

See id. at 103-04.
McDonald v. State, 553 P.2d 171, 176, 179 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976).
See People v. Payne, 358 N.E.2d 409, 410-11 (Ill. App. Ct. 1976).
People v. Roblas, 568 P.2d 57, 59 (Colo. 1977).
Id. at 59-60.
See supra Parts IV.A.2–7.
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sequestered in the Wyoming State archives.297 These pages establish the
centrality of the suppression claim and the importance of Wilde in the
creation of the Brady doctrine.
B. The Facts of the Wilde Case
As the newly discovered documents make clear, in his pro se petition
for writ of habeas corpus, Victor Donald Wilde alleged the following: A
stranger named Henry Wallace approached him at a bus station in
Madison, Nebraska.298 Wallace was driving to California and looking
for paying passengers.299 Wilde, who was seeking to visit his mother in
California, agreed to accompany Wallace, pay half the expenses, and
share the driving load.300 Upon starting their trip, the two men picked
up two young hitchhikers in their late teens.301 Around midnight, the
four men checked into a motel room in eastern Wyoming with two
beds.302 Wilde shared a bed with Wallace, who made “indecent
advances in a homosexual manner” that Wilde rebuffed, prompting
some words between the two men.303
The next day, Wallace bought and drank nearly three pints of
whiskey; “as Wallace progressed in his drinking, his temper and
disposition became meaner.”304 Wallace kept harping on the incident
from the prior night, prompting Wilde to become disgusted and ask to
be let out of the car.305 However, Wallace continued driving for another
fifteen to twenty minutes while muttering under his breath before
jamming on the brakes and pulling over to the side of the road.306
Wallace then exited the car and opened the passenger door, leading
to Wilde falling out of the car.307 Before Wilde could “right himself,”

297 A compendium of these documents can be viewed at Appendix to Colin Miller,
The Right to Evidence of Innocence Before Pleading Guilty, available online at
https://lawreview.law.ucdavis.edu/files/53-1_Miller_Appendix.pdf [hereinafter Appendix].
298 Affidavit in Support of Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at 3, Wilde v.
Wyoming, No. 7239 (Wyo. 1959), Miller, reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297,
at 8.
299 Id.
300 Id.
301 Id.
302 Id.
303 Id.
304 Id.
305 Id.
306 Id.
307 Id. at 3-4, Miller, reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297, at 8-9.
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Wallace began attacking him.308 Wilde, however, got the better of
Wallace, knocking him down four to five times.309 Wilde saw Wallace
stumbling to the front seat of the car and thought that he had given
up.310 Upon turning around to look for a resting spot, Wilde “heard a
warning shout from the car.”311 It was the hitchhikers warning Wilde
that Wallace had a gun. When Wilde turned around, he “was facing a
wildly infuriated Wallace who definitely had the look of murder about
him.”312 Wilde, who carried a gun on him, “instinctively drew and fired
without thinking,” killing Wallace.313
The hitchhikers and Wilde then got Wallace’s body into the car and
drove to a gas station because the gas tank was close to empty.314 While
Wilde was filling up the car, the hitchhikers ran away.315 Wilde then
drove the car toward a sheriff’s station, but the car went off an icy
highway, which is where a sheriff’s posse arrested him.316
Wilde was later charged with first-degree murder.317 He had two
appointed attorneys, one of whom might have been named Ivan
Jones.318 After Wilde told his story to his attorneys, they responded that
it was a clear case of self-defense.319 Thereafter, however, Wilde was left
alone in county jail for twenty days.320 Eventually, the sheriff came and
asked if he would plead guilty to second-degree murder because
otherwise he would be convicted of first-degree murder and be given
the death penalty.321
Wilde asked to see his attorneys and was told he couldn’t see them
unless he went to court. Wilde agreed and saw one of his attorneys, who
told him he would not represent him unless Wilde paid him $1,500,
which would lead to Wilde not serving a day in prison.322 When Wilde
refused, his attorney told him to plead guilty to second-degree
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Id. at 4, Miller, reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297, at 9.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5, Miller, reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297, at 10.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 6, Miller, reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297, at 11.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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murder.323 Without his attorney present, Wilde entered the judge’s
chamber on December 13, 1945 and pleaded guilty to second-degree
murder, resulting in him being given a life sentence.324
In his habeas petition, Wilde alleged several errors. First and
foremost, Wilde claimed that the State (1) suppressed exculpatory
statements by the hitchhikers that would have proven his claim of selfdefense; and (2) intimidated the hitchhikers into making false
statements against him at the coroner’s jury.325 Second, while Wilde
admitted that he met with attorneys twice, he alleged that he was
deprived of his right to counsel by not having an attorney present when
he pleaded guilty.326 Third, Wilde made various other claims such as
the denial of his right to a grand jury and being given an illegal sentence
of “natural life” when the statute authorized a sentence of twenty years
to life.327
In its answer, the State curtly responded that Wilde “was properly
represented by counsel, that in all instances he had the benefit of due
process of law, and none of his constitutional rights were invaded or
denied.”328 The court’s order denying Wilde’s petition and a hearing on
his petition was equally short, with the court quickly responding that
“Victor Donald Wilde is legally detained in custody.”329
C. Why Wilde Should be Resuscitated
Obviously, the facts alleged by Wilde should be taken with a grain of
salt, and it would be nice to hear the State’s version of events. But the
lack of the State’s version is also kind of the point. The Supreme Court
remanded because neither the State nor the Wyoming courts had
refuted Wilde’s allegations,330 which principally related to the
suppression of statements by the hitchhikers.331 The Court also
remanded on the issue of the denial of the right to counsel,332 but this
323

Id.
Id.
325 See id.
326 Id. at 8, Miller, reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297, at 13.
327 See id. at 7-10, Miller, reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297, at 12-15.
328 See Return and Answer to Writ for Habeas Corpus at 1-2, Wilde v. Wyoming, No.
7239 (Wyo. 1959), reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297, at 17-18.
329 See Order Denying Writ at 1, Wilde v. Wyoming, No. 7239 (Wyo. 1959),
reprinted in Miller, Appendix, supra note 297, at 3.
330 Wilde v. Wyoming, 362 U.S. 607, 607 (1960) (“We find nothing in our
examination of the record to justify the denial of hearing on these allegations.”).
331 See supra Part IV.B.
332 Wilde, 362 U.S. at 607.
324
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was not based on the total denial of that right but instead just denial of
that right at the moment of pleading.333 Notably, the Court did not
remand on Wilde’s other allegations, implying that it highlighted the
suppression and counsel claims as the ones stating constitutional
violations (unless refuted by the State). And, of course, when the Brady
Court cited Wilde as extending the due process test first enunciated in
Mooney,334 it was speaking solely about suppression, which implicates
the Due Process Clause, and not the denial of the right to counsel, which
implicates the Sixth Amendment.335
The fact that Wilde was a case that was principally about the
suppression of eyewitness statements before a defendant pleaded guilty
bolsters the argument that it should be revitalized to recognize a clear
right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty. As noted, the
Supreme Court itself as well as other courts and commentators have
found that the Brady doctrine was merely an extension of the Mooney
line of cases, with Brady simply making the good faith or bad faith of
the State irrelevant.336 Given the limited nature of the Brady extension,
it seems like the legitimacy of the Brady doctrine hinges on the existence
of pre-existing precedent holding that the State’s suppression of
material exculpatory evidence can violate the Due Process Clause.
And yet, four of the six Supreme Court cases cited by the Brady Court
— Mooney v. Holohan, Durley v. Mayo, Alcorta v. Texas, and Napue v.
Illinois — solely dealt with the subornation of perjury and had nothing
to do with the suppression of evidence.337 Meanwhile, a fifth case —
Pyle v. Kansas — dealt principally with the subornation of perjury338
and only secondarily with the suppression of evidence.339 In this
context, the importance of Wilde is apparent. As the only pre-Brady case
based principally on the suppression of exculpatory evidence, it would
seem to provide the heart of the Brady doctrine. Conversely, if Wilde is
not seen as recognizing a due process right to exculpatory evidence, the

333

See supra Part IV.B.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
335 See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy
the right . . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense.”).
336 See supra notes 218–29 and accompanying text.
337 See Gershman, supra note 220, at 693, 693 n.36; see also United States v. Bagley,
473 U.S. 667, 679 n.8 (1985) (“In fact, the Brady rule has its roots in a series of cases
dealing with convictions based on the prosecution’s knowing use of perjured
testimony.”).
338 As noted, the Court found that Pyle’s claims of subornation and suppression were
supported by Pyle’s exhibits, which solely related to his subornation claim.
339 See Gershman, supra note 220, at 693 n.38.
334
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Brady doctrine appears difficult to defend, given that the Brady Court
itself acknowledged that it wasn’t breaking much new ground.
And, indeed, other commentators have challenged the foundational
weakness of the Brady doctrine. For instance, Professor Colin Starger
has noted that “it is quite a leap to infer an affirmative duty to disclose
exculpatory evidence from cases that imposed a negative prohibition on
suborning perjury or allowing lies to stand uncorrected.”340 Meanwhile,
Professor Eugene Cerruti has observed that on the eve of Brady “there
was virtually no law requiring pretrial discovery by the defense of
exculpatory material within the state’s possession,” with Mooney and its
progeny dealing solely with subornation of perjury.341
The Supreme Court itself has even recognized the possible
foundational weakness of the Brady doctrine. In Imbler v. Pachtman, the
Court addressed the question of whether the test for qualified immunity
differs depending on whether a prosecutor suppressed evidence or
suborned perjury.342 While Justice White’s concurrence would have
drawn such a distinction, the majority found that “the distinction is not
susceptible of practical application” because “[a] claim of using
perjured testimony simply may be reframed and asserted as a claim of
suppression of the evidence upon which the knowledge of perjury
rested.”343 As support for this claim, the Court cited to its prior opinions
“discussing the constitutional prohibitions against both practices,”
including Mooney v. Holohan, Alcorta v. Texas, and Brady v. Maryland.344
But this citation was incorrect because Mooney and Alcorta solely
discussed the subornation of perjury and did not mention suppressed
evidence.345
The reality is that Pyle v. Kansas and Wilde v. Wyoming were the only
two pre-Brady Supreme Court cases dealing with the suppression of
exculpatory evidence.346 This explains why, as noted, courts often cited
340 Colin Starger, Expanding Stare Decisis: The Role of Precedent in the Unfolding
Dialectic of Brady v. Maryland, 46 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 77, 123 (2012).
341 Eugene Cerruti, Through the Looking-Glass at the Brady Doctrine: Some New
Reflections on White Queens, Hobgoblins, and Due Process, 94 KY. L.J. 211, 227 (20052006).
342 Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 n.34 (1976).
343 Id.
344 Id.
345 See supra notes 10–27, 55–68 and accompanying text.
346 Professor Gershman references Wilde and Pyle as two of the cases that the Brady
Court extended to create the Brady doctrine but only identifies Pyle as a case involving
the suppression of favorable evidence. See Gershman, supra note 220, at 693 (“In only
one of those decisions [Pyle] did the Court cite the prosecutor’s failure to disclose
favorable evidence.”).
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Wilde and Pyle in conjunction as the pre-Brady cases standing for the
proposition that the suppression of favorable evidence can violate due
process.347 Since 1974, however, courts have only cited Pyle for this
proposition.348 Pyle’s continuing vitality349 provides support for the
claim that Wilde should be resuscitated.
Standing alone, Wilde could be dismissed as a case in which the
Supreme Court merely remanded a petitioner’s claim that the State’s
suppression of exculpatory evidence violated the Due Process Clause
and did not actually find such a violation. But a review of Pyle reveals
the exact same factual context. Like Victor Wilde, Harry Pyle filed a pro
se petition for writ of habeas corpus alleging the suppression of
exculpatory evidence, and, like Wilde, Pyle merely received a
remand.350 Indeed, after Pyle was remanded, the Supreme Court of
Kansas found no evidence that the State had suborned perjury or
suppressed evidence351 while there is some indication that Wilde was
given relief on remand.352
Finally, it is important to note that the Brady Court held that Pyle v.
Kansas phrased the due process rule from Mooney v. Holohan “in
broader terms.”353 In Mooney, the Court actually dismissed the
defendant’s case, finding that he had pleaded a plausible due process
violation but failed to seek state habeas relief.354 Moreover, as noted,
when Mooney did seek state habeas relief, the Supreme Court of
California found no evidence of a due process violation.355 And yet,
courts continue to cite Mooney to find due process violations.356

347

See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
See supra note 278 and accompanying text.
349 See supra notes 240–244 and accompanying text.
350 See supra notes 28–37 and accompanying text.
351 Supra note 38 and accompanying text.
352 As noted, Wilde alleged, inter alia, that he was improperly given a “natural life”
sentence instead of a sentence of twenty years to life. See supra Part IV.B. No court
records exist indicating whether Wilde received habeas relief on remand. Victor Donald
Wilde, however, was clearly released from prison because he later pleaded guilty to
murder in Idaho, with the Court of Appeals of Idaho affirming his conviction in 1983.
See State v. Wilde, 660 P.2d 73 (Idaho Ct. App. 1983). That opinion obliquely references
the fact that Wilde “had previously served a prison sentence in Wyoming for another
homicide.” Id. at 74. Wilde’s appellate counsel in Idaho has no recollection of whether
Wilde was eventually given relief in his Wyoming case. Telephone Interview with Laird
Stone, Wilde’s former attorney (October 10, 2018).
353 See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
354 Supra notes 24–25 and accompanying text.
355 See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
356 See supra notes 233–238 and accompanying text.
348
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In conclusion, then, the continuing vitality of Pyle and Mooney means
that there is no good reason to ignore Wilde. It is true that the Wilde
Court merely remanded, but that was the same action taken by the Pyle
Court and certainly no worse than the dismissal in Mooney. Because
courts continue to cite Mooney and Pyle as illustrations of due process
violations,357 they should do the same with Wilde. Therefore, unless
Wilde has been repudiated, courts, including the Supreme Court,
should resuscitate Wilde to find a right to evidence of innocence before
pleading guilty that is part of the heart of the Brady doctrine.
This wouldn’t be the first instance of such a resuscitation. In 1794,
the Supreme Court issued its opinion in United States v. Yale Todd at a
time when there was no official reporter, leading to the opinion being
forgotten.358 Later, in its 1851 opinion in United States v. Ferreira, the
Supreme Court rediscovered Yale Todd and recognized that it resolved
“a question which was left in doubt by the opinions of the different
judges.”359 The Ferreira Court then resuscitated Yale Todd by appending
it to its opinion “in order that it may not be overlooked, if similar
questions should hereafter arise.”360 If the Supreme Court were to revive
Wilde, it would similarly be binding precedent on lower courts.361
The remaining question, however, is whether the Supreme Court
impliedly repudiated Wilde in United States v. Ruiz.
V.

THE SUPREME COURT DID NOT REPUDIATE WILDE IN RUIZ

As noted, in United States v. Ruiz, the Supreme Court held that there
is no pre-plea right to material impeachment evidence.362 The Ruiz
Court did not explicitly reference Wilde, but Ruiz could be seen as an
implied repudiation of Wilde if (1) Ruiz could be read in conjunction
with other Supreme Court precedent as a rejection of a right to evidence
of innocence before pleading guilty; or (2) Ruiz itself could be read as a
rejection of a right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty. The
following two Sections will address these possibilities.

357

See supra notes 233–238, 240–244 and accompanying text.
See United States v. Ferreira, 54 U.S. 40, 52 (1851).
359 Id.
360 Id.
361 See Stephen E. Sachs, The “Constitution in Exile” as a Problem for Legal Theory, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2253, 2270 (2014) (“[O]ne might always discover a long-forgotten
Supreme Court decision [such as Yale Todd] addressing a disputed point, which would
then be precedent binding on lower courts.”).
362 See supra notes 177–180 and accompanying text.
358
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A. No Distinction Between Impeachment and Substantive Evidence
As noted, some courts have taken a two-step approach to finding that
Ruiz can be read in conjunction with other Supreme Court precedent as
rejecting a right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty.363
First, Ruiz held that there is no pre-plea right to material impeachment
evidence.364 Second, the Supreme Court affirmed in United States v.
Bagley that “[t]his Court has rejected any such distinction between
impeachment evidence and exculpatory evidence.”365 Therefore, these
courts conclude that the Ruiz Court’s finding that there is no pre-plea
right to material impeachment evidence means that there is no pre-plea
right to material substantive evidence.366
These courts, however, are ignoring the limited nature of the Bagley
Court’s ruling. As noted, in Bagley, the Ninth Circuit held that the
State’s suppression of impeachment evidence required automatic
reversal without a showing of materiality under Brady.367 The Supreme
Court later reversed, holding that “[t]his Court has rejected any such
distinction between impeachment evidence and exculpatory
evidence.”368 The Bagley Court’s use of the word “such” is important
because it means the Supreme Court was merely saying that it had
rejected any distinction between impeachment and substantive
evidence in terms of Brady’s materiality analysis. As one district court
has noted, “[t]he ‘any such distinction’ referred to the lower court’s
conclusion that omission of impeachment information mandated an
automatic reversal, whereas omission of exculpatory information did
not require automatic reversal.”369 Therefore, “[t]he Court in Bagley did
not categorically reject all distinctions between exculpatory and
impeachment evidence.”370
This, of course, makes sense because the Supreme Court “has not
treated exculpatory evidence and impeachment information as
indistinguishable.”371 Multiple examples can be found in the Federal
Rules of Evidence (“FRE”) adopted by the Supreme Court in 1972. For
instance, a prior inconsistent statement by a witness that was not made
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See supra notes 182–189 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 178–180 and accompanying text.
United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 676 (1985).
See supra note 184 and accompanying text.
See Bagley, 473 U.S. at 676.
Id. (emphasis added).
United States v. Nelson, 59 F. Supp. 3d 15, 21 (D.D.C. 2014).
Id.
Id.
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subject to the penalty of perjury is admissible under FRE 613 to
impeach the witness but inadmissible as substantive evidence of the
truth of the matter asserted.372 And evidence of a subsequent remedial
measure is generally inadmissible as substantive evidence but
potentially admissible as impeachment evidence under FRE 407.373 The
Supreme Court has also created an “impeachment exception” to the
exclusionary rule that allows illegally obtained evidence to be offered
for impeachment, but not substantive, purposes.374
Therefore, the mere fact that the Bagley Court did not distinguish
between impeachment evidence and substantive evidence in terms of
materiality tells us little about whether the Supreme Court would
distinguish between impeachment evidence and substantive evidence in
terms of the applicability of the Brady doctrine in the pleading context.
The last remaining question is thus whether the Ruiz Court itself
conflated impeachment evidence and substantive evidence in this
context.
B. The Ruiz Court Did Not Repudiate Wilde
In finding no pre-plea right to material impeachment evidence, the
Supreme Court clearly distinguished a case like Ruiz from a case like
Wilde. The Ruiz Court focused upon the extent to which recognizing a
pre-plea right to material impeachment evidence would provide an
additional safeguard for innocent defendants.375 In rejecting the
defendant’s concern that the lack of such a right would lead to innocent
defendants pleading guilty, the Ruiz Court observed that the plea
agreement offered to the defendant stated that “the Government will
provide ‘any information establishing the factual innocence of the
defendant’ regardless.”376 By making this observation, the Court
acknowledged that the result would, or at least could, have been
different if the State had withheld substantive evidence of innocence
instead of impeachment evidence.377
372 See FED. R. EVID. 613; FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(1)(A) (allowing for the admission of
prior inconsistent statements made subject to the penalty of perjury for substantive and
impeachment purposes).
373 See FED. R. EVID. 407 (noting that evidence of a subsequent remedial measure is
inadmissible for several substantive purposes but potentially admissible for
impeachment purposes).
374 See James v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 307, 320 (1990).
375 See United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 631 (2002).
376 Id.
377 See, e.g., McCann v. Mangialardi, 337 F.3d 782, 788 (7th Cir. 2003) (finding that
this language makes it “highly likely that the Supreme Court would find a violation of
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In finding no pre-plea right to material impeachment evidence, the
Ruiz Court also focused on other factors that distinguish impeachment
evidence from substantive evidence of innocence. The Ruiz Court noted
that there is no pre-plea right to impeachment evidence because “the
need for this information is more closely related to the fairness of a trial
than to the voluntariness of the plea.”378 By concluding that
impeachment evidence is “special” in relation to the fairness of trials,
the Ruiz court implied that substantive evidence of innocence does
relate to the voluntariness of pleas.379 In other words, if impeachment
evidence is “special” in relation to the fairness of trials, this implies that
substantive evidence in not specially connected to trials and that its
suppression in connection with pleading can violate the Brady doctrine.
The Ruiz Court also observed that “[i]t is particularly difficult to
characterize impeachment information as critical information of which
the defendant must always be aware prior to pleading guilty given the
random way in which such information may, or may not, help a
particular defendant.”380 This particular difficulty relates to the fact that
defendants (and often prosecutors) do not know whether particular
witnesses will be critical or even called before the defendant pleads
guilty.381 Conversely, there is no such difficulty in characterizing
substantive evidence of innocence such as a video showing that an
assault did not occur, exculpatory eyewitness statements, or DNA
evidence.382
The Ruiz Court’s reasoning makes clear that the Court did not
definitely rule on a right to evidence of innocence before pleading
guilty, meaning it should not be read as an implied repudiation of Wilde.
the Due Process Clause if prosecutors or other relevant government actors have
knowledge of a criminal defendant’s factual innocence but fail to disclose such
information to a defendant before he enters into a guilty plea”); Russell D. Covey, PleaBargaining Law After Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV. 595, 604 (2013) (noting that, by
using this language, the Ruiz Court “expressly declined to consider whether the same
analysis applies to substantive evidence of factual innocence”).
378 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 633 (emphasis in original).
379 See, e.g., United States v. Lovato, Cr. No. 11-02416-JCH, 2012 WL 13076317, at
*1 n.1 (D.N.M. Oct. 2, 2012) (“The government thus relies on Ruiz for the proposition
that impeachment evidence ‘is special in relation to the fairness of a trial,’ and can be
distinguished from exculpatory evidence which may be used to support a defendant’s
factual innocence.”) (emphasis in original).
380 Ruiz, 536 U.S. at 630.
381 See id. (“The degree of help . . . will depend upon the defendant’s own
independent knowledge of the prosecution’s potential case — a matter that the
Constitution does not require prosecutors to disclose.”).
382 See, e.g., Buffey v. Ballard, 782 S.E.2d 204, 221 (W. Va. 2015) (finding a Brady
violation based on the State’s pre-plea suppression of exculpatory DNA evidence).
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Moreover, “the Court in Ruiz used the terms ‘exculpatory’ and
‘impeachment’ separately, rather than as identical terms,”383 again
invalidating any claim of an implied repudiation. Therefore, courts
should view Wilde as a viable Supreme Court opinion holding that the
right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty is clearly
established federal law.
CONCLUSION
In Brady v. Maryland, the Supreme Court held that the State has an
affirmative obligation under the Due Process Clause to disclose material
exculpatory evidence to defendants.384 In the wake of United States v.
Ruiz, however, many courts have held that defendants have no pre-plea
right to substantive evidence of innocence.385 Given that around 95% of
convictions are secured through guilty pleas,386 such an interpretation
of Brady means that few defendants are entitled to evidence of their
innocence before being convicted. This statistic is significant because it
is now clear that innocent defendants do plead guilty. Specifically, in
2015 and 2016, a total of 139 out of 314 DNA and non-DNA exonerees
(44.26%) had been convicted after guilty pleas.387
But courts finding no pre-plea right to substantive evidence of
innocence are ignoring a key part of the foundation of the Brady
doctrine. The Brady Court held that the Brady doctrine was an
extension of six prior Supreme Court cases, four of which dealt solely
with the subornation of perjury.388 That leaves two cases cited by the
Brady Court that dealt with the suppression of exculpatory evidence:
(1) Pyle v. Kansas, in which the Court remanded a claim that the State
suppressed evidence of innocence before trial;389 and (2) Wilde v.
Wyoming, in which the Court remanded a claim that the State
suppressed evidence of innocence before a guilty plea.390 For years,
courts cited these two cases in conjunction to conclude that the
suppression of material exculpatory evidence violates Due Process
383

United States v. Nelson, 59 F. Supp. 3d 15, 21 (D.D.C. 2014).
See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
385 See supra notes 182–189, 196–209 and accompanying text.
386 See Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 372 (2010).
387 See NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2016 1-2 (2017),
https://www.law.umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2016.pdf;
NAT’L REGISTRY OF EXONERATIONS, EXONERATIONS IN 2015 8 (2016), http://www.law.
umich.edu/special/exoneration/Documents/Exonerations_in_2015.pdf.
388 See supra note 335 and accompanying text.
389 See supra notes 28–39 and accompanying text.
390 See supra notes 84–85 and accompanying text.
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Clause.391 But while Wilde has never been repudiated, it has fallen off
the map392 while courts continue to cite Pyle for this proposition.393
By unearthing the pleadings in the Wilde case, this Article has
established that Victor Donald Wilde’s habeas petition primarily
claimed that his guilty plea was induced by the State’s suppression of
exculpatory eyewitness statements. Therefore, by remanding in Wilde,
the Supreme Court recognized a right to evidence before pleading guilty
just as it recognized a right to evidence of innocence before trial by
remanding in Pyle. Courts should therefore resuscitate Wilde to find a
clear right to evidence of innocence before pleading guilty.
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See supra note 277 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 269–286 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 239–244 and accompanying text.

